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ABSTRACT 
Within the last ten years the phrase ethnic conflict has become extremely 
common. I spent the majority of my time as a Special Forces Detachment Commander 
dealing with ethnic conflict situations in Northern Iraq, Turkey, and the Balkans. While 
in these places it became apparent to me that ethnic conflict is very complicated and that 
most Americans have a difficult time comprehending it. My purpose in writing this 
thesis is to offer Special Forces soldiers or other US military personnel a framework for 
gaining a better understanding of the dynamics involved in ethnic conflict. This 
framework includes three preconditions and two advanced conditions which are tested 
against three case studies: Bosnia, Kosovo, and Kurdish/Turkish relations in Southeast 
Turkey. The framework offers an objective, non country-specific, way to sort through 
and make sense of the situation on the ground. After becoming familiar with this 
framework, it would be my hope that the individual will have the ability to function more 
effectively and efficiently, particularly when there is little time to become intimately 
familiar with the situation before arriving on the scene. 
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I.        INTRODUCTION 
I have spent a great deal of time thinking about ethnic conflict. As a Special Forces 
Detachment Commander in 19961 spent four months in Northern Iraq during Operation 
Provide Comfort. While there, my team worked closely with the Kurdish factions and the 
Turkish military. We witnessed, first-hand, much of the hatred and disdain that the 
members of the two ethnicities feel for each other. I also completed two five month tours in 
Bosnia during Operation Joint Guard and Joint Endeavor, working as a Joint 
Commissioned Observer, living with Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims and providing 
"ground truth" to my chain of command. 
In these places, I learned, up close, about ethnic conflict. I spent many hours 
debriefing, interviewing, and just talking to the many individuals involved. These people 
included soldiers, politicians, teachers, interpreters, and just about everybody in between. I 
found the dynamics of ethnic conflict far different from anything most of us in the US can 
comprehend. I learned that to really understand what was happening, what was going to 
happen, or how one side would react to something, a Special Forces soldier had to 
submerge himself in the situation. Over the course of my deployments to Northern Iraq 
and Bosnia I always considered my first deployment to Northern Iraq to be the most 
confusing. I was only able to make sense of much of what I saw after I came back. During 
the next deployment it took me less time - still one to two months - to understand the 
dynamics. During my final deployment I felt in sync almost immediately. But now, after 
studying about ethnic conflict more formally, I understand even more about the inner- 
workings of places where I was. 
My aim in this thesis is to re-formulate this understanding so that other Special 
Forces soldiers won't have to go on three deployments before being able to quickly 
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understand the significance of the ethnic lay of the land, regardless of where they may be 
sent. 
If I had had such a framework it would have saved me precious time on becoming 
situationally aware. Ethnic conflict is a complicated business. It often takes months on the 
ground - even with a thorough pre-mission train up - to figure out what has happened, 
what is currently happening, and what will happen. Yet, these are questions my chain of 
command hit us with the day our feet hit the ground. Having a framework to apply would 
not eliminate all the haze, but it could certainly make the situation much less opaque. 
Special Forces soldiers are often involved in making assessments or providing 
insight and information to their superiors. It is in the operator's best interests to understand 
inter-ethnic workings in order to avoid becoming a tool for one faction or the other. 
Understanding the big picture is an operator's best defense against being used - and 
becoming completely biased. There is nothing worse than witnessing a detachment, 
negligent in doing its homework, become a simple mouthpiece. I can recall countless 
examples of teams that lived with one faction and eventually adopted that side's point of 
view. Knowledge and an understanding of the ethnic mechanics involved in ethnic conflict 
could prevent that. 
A Special Forces soldier will build instant credibility if he can demonstrate that he 
has a working knowledge of the local situation. It is difficult to be taken seriously, or avoid 
being taken advantage of, if you don't understand the situation or can't get beyond the 
basics. 
A framework for understanding the dynamics involved in ethnic conflict can be 
enlightening. If you don't have a framework to deal with, the pieces are there but they 
don't neatly fit together. The framework could help make better sense of a given situation 
and prevent soldiers from having to completely live in the present. It also could place 
certain things, like economic collapse or disparity, in their proper perspective. 
For instance, instead of a Special Forces soldier conducting a mission in a country and 
thinking that the country has always been poor and benighted, a deeper understanding of 
the country's economic situation might make more sense of the economic disparity 
between groups - always a potential fault line. 
A framework can also help prevent people from allowing their negative impressions 
to lead to sweeping generalizations. Unfortunately, this is all too tempting once one has 
witnessed ethic hatred. Nevertheless, views expressed in phrases such as, "these people just 
hate each other", "they're all just ignorant", "these people have fought for centuries and 
they will continue to fight for centuries", etc. actually explain very little. Worse, these 
negative feelings can easily build up and develop into an attitude of disinterest and apathy. 
In addition to helping make sense of an otherwise unfamiliar and potentially 
alienating situation, the framework I propose could also be used to predict ethnic conflict. 
If the preconditions the framework describes are present then the chances of conflict are 
much greater.   It would be useful to know that people can have a history of conflict and 
mutual hatred, but that this is rarely sufficient to cause ethnic war. History is just a piece 
of the puzzle. Economics and politics are also significant. 
A.       THE FRAMEWORK 
After surveying a number of ethnic conflict models, and theories dealing with 
causes of ethnic conflict, from Martin van Creveld's Transformation of War, and his Rise 
and Decline of the State, Ted Gurr's Minorities at Risk, and Jurg Helbling's The 
Nationalist Game I found that the framework which most closely fit my own first hand 
observations and experiences was that described by Stuart J. Kaufman in his 1996 article 
International Security article, "Spiraling Towards Ethnic Conflict". I have added a few 
things and somewhat modified his model, but my framework is largely based on his. 
Crucial to the framework is the idea that there are three preconditions and two 
advanced conditions that must be present in order for ethnic conflict to occur. The first 
precondition is the existence of a history of ethnic tension between ethnic groups. The 
second precondition is an economic downturn or economic inequality between ethnic 
groups. The third precondition is political inequality between ethnic groups. It is necessary 
to have all three of these preconditions met before the stage is set for the two advanced 
conditions - and eventual ethnic conflict. It is very important to note that these 
preconditions can be real or perceived. 
The first advanced condition is mass hostility, i.e. the common people of an ethnic 
group begin to hate on a large scale and are willing to engage in open warfare; this hate can 
be mutual or one-sided. The second advanced condition is the coming to power of political 
entrepreneurs, i.e. politicians ready and willing to exploit ethnic tension for their personal 
gain or for the gains of their ethnic group. Either one of the advanced conditions may 
develop first and eventually ignite the second. When both advanced conditions are met 
ethnic violence is almost sure to follow. 
1.        Preconditions 
Emotional and psychological forces make ethnic conflict a less rational form of 
warfare. These forces are wrapped up in the precondition of a history of inter-ethnic 
tension. This history is very useful because in most cases ethnic groups have been steeped 
in it, the injustices and evil acts are real and, in the three cases I describe, there are living 
eyewitnesses to pass on the tales. Ethnic tension reveals itself in a historical fear of 
domination by one side of the other. A minority might fear it will lose its cultural identity. 
Or the majority in a minority enclave may see its share of the population declining. This 
fear can be heightened by the use of threatening ethnic symbols, which intimidate rivals 
and serve as an emotional rallying point for one's own side. These symbols come in the 
form of flags, crests, colors, clothing, facial hair, music, etc. Another way in which ethnic 
tension reveals itself is in negative ethnic stereotyping and in demeaning ethnic jokes. All 
this hate and mistrust eventually leads - with the help of other conditions - to the belief 
that one side will become physically or culturally extinct. It is this feeling that leads to 
violence. 
The economic precondition is extremely important. There may be economic 
inequality between groups or a general economic downturn that causes mass insecurity. 
This factor is critical because most people who are economically buoyant are hard to 
mobilize. These people have something invested in the current system, are doing well by it 
and thus feel little need to fight. People who feel that they have little to lose economically 
- or people who have lost everything - are more susceptible to mobilization along ethnic 
lines. A general economic downturn can also lead to large-scale unemployment - 
especially of young men. When this happens violence is never far away. 
Political inequality is also important. When members of an ethnic group sense they 
are not being equally represented animosity builds. If these political inequalities - real or 
perceived - are not addressed a feeling will develop eventually that "we, as an ethnic 
group, can better handle our own affairs". When this feeling catches on, the group may 
peacefully, or violently struggle for more autonomy, depending on other conditions. 
2.        Advanced Conditions 
Advanced conditions have already been described as mass hostility and the coming 
to power of political entrepreneurs. These advanced conditions are not clear-cut; they can 
develop simultaneously or in spurts. It is very difficult to point out where and when one 
ends and the other begins, but both are real and necessary in ethic conflict. 
The mass hostility advanced condition occurs when the mass of an ethnic group is 
willing to fight over grievances with another ethnic group. This stage can be arrived at 
through a number of means. A leader can whip up hostile feelings or the population can 
come to feel hostility on its own given events such as massacres, mass arrests, or an 
opposing ethnicity's takeover of the government.   Usually there is an event or series of 
events that so threatens the security of an ethnic population that its members feel fighting 
and killing are justified, even when this means preemptive violence. 
Political entrepreneurs are people who come to power and exploit ethnic tensions 
for their personal gain and/or on behalf of their ethnic group. The distinction is important. 
Rabid nationalists who come to power may be much more difficult to deal with than 
someone who is playing an ethnic card for personal gain. Another factor to consider is 
that, over time, a person who exploited nationalism to get to power may have a turn of 
mind and become more of a true nationalist, or vice versa. The bottom line is that political 
entrepreneurs who come to power will eventually either incite mass hate or use its presence 
to wage war in order to benefit themselves or their ethnic group. These individuals usually 
have maximalist aims, they are very poor at compromise, and they are willing to go to 
extremely violent lengths to attain what they or their followers desire. 
B.       CASES CONSIDERED 
The cases I use for testing the framework are Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Turkish- 
Kurdish conflict. I limited the cases to locations I have been or am likely to go. I have 
been to Bosnia and Turkey. I have not been to Kosovo; however, I have done copious 
amounts of planning for deployments to Kosovo, and have interviewed numerous Special 
Forces soldiers who have been there. I have maintained a serious interest in these places 
since my deployments. My Special Forces Group's regional orientation includes these 
countries. I have received countless intelligence briefings and have read numerous books 
and articles dealing with these areas. I have also used my field notes, reports and message 
traffic from these deployments to aid me in analyzing these cases for this thesis. The cases 
are similar - they all involve ethnic conflict - but are all also different enough to illustrate 
the universal applicability of this framework. 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALY LEFT BLANK 
II.       BOSNIA 
A.        HISTORY OF ETHNIC TENSION 
Many people would argue that the problems in Bosnia have been caused by 
thousands of years of ethnic hatred. This is an easy explanation, but as is usually the case, 
doesn't answer questions about how, when, or why tensions erupt into conflict. In the 
following section I will address these ethnic tensions, which are real and very powerful, but 
are just one piece of the puzzle of ethnic conflict. 
1.        Fear of Domination 
In examining the Balkans - and, arguably, other regions of the world - we must 
bear in mind that the perception of history is much more relevant than the reality ofthat 
history; second, that history in the Balkans remains integral and relevant to all parties (i.e. 
things that happened 800 years ago can be mixed interchangeably with what happened 
yesterday); third, history is always one of the first things brought up in a conversation with 
any faction member, and thus must be considered an indicator of backward-looking-ness. 
Serbs are probably the most backwards looking of all the factions. They use history 
in some very negative ways. From an objective viewpoint, it can appear to outsiders that 
this, among other thing, is what holds them back from a prosperous economic future. 
From the Bosnian Serb point of view the Bosnian Muslims dominated them for 
hundreds of years under the Ottoman Empire. Although the occupying Ottomans were 
mild rulers by most standards, this is where perceptions of history come into play. Serbs 
have chosen to remember the worst about those times; for example they remember that 
they could not build church steeples higher than the mosques' minarets or that they could 
not own land under the Ottomans. The thing that really bothers Serbs is that they regard 
Slavic Muslims as Serbs and Croats who converted in order to receive preferential 
treatment from the Ottomans. These Ottoman lackeys (as Serbs call them) then became the 
landlords of the Serbs and Croats. 
It is also important to understand where the name "Cetnik" comes from. Cetnik is a 
slang word used to identify a Serb soldier, but it originated from Serb guerrilla fighters 
battling the Ottomans in the 19th Century.   A large part of the Serb identity is based on 
fighting Muslims. One especially sees this among Serbs in the Krajina. They were brought 
to the Krajina for one reason: to live on the frontier and defend Europe from the Muslims. 
The bottom line for the Serbs is that Muslims dominated them for centuries and thus they 
continue to harbor a fear of being dominated by Muslims again, either through political or 
military means. Though outsiders might scoff at such fear today its persistence only 
underlines the importance of trying to understand the Serb point of view. For Serbs this is 
a real fear no matter how unrealistic it may seem to others. 
Serbs do not have to look back very far to find historical circumstances that would 
cause them to fear domination from Croatians. Many Serbs who survived the WWII 
experience can still vividly remember the Ustase and concentration camps at places like 
Jasonovac. During WWII the Ustase rampaged through Bosnia, converting a third of the 
Serbs to Catholicism, deporting a third, and killing a third. It is also worth noting that Ante 
Pavlic, the founder and leader of the Ustase, welcomed Bosnian Muslims into his 
organization. These memories of domination and extermination are hard to expunge from a 
group's psyche and are easily brought back to the surface, especially when examples can be 
drawn from living memory. 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats, meanwhile, fear domination from a Serbia that 
historically has felt that its destiny is to control the Balkans. Feelings about Serbian 
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nationalism and superiority, coupled with the brutal treatment of minorities, such as the 
Kosovo Albanians and Hungarians, have been enough to fuel a sense of insecurity among 
the Bosnian Muslims and Croats. From the Bosnian Muslim and Croat point of view there 
is also the militaristic character of the Serbs to deal with. For instance, once the Serbs 
finally did wrest control of Serbia from the Ottomans they expelled most Muslims and 
went about destroying everything Turkish, from mosques to Turkish coffee shops. They 
engaged again in this same behavior after the Serbs took parts of Kosovo and Macedonia 
from the Ottomans during the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars. Attempts were made to erase any 
hint that Islam was ever present (Bennett, 1995, pp. 25-28). These historical incidents, 
combined with what was happening in the early 1990s, could have led to a genuine fear of 
Serbian domination. 
On their own these suspicions and past wrongs are extremely corrosive to the fabric 
of Bosnian society, but combined with the following factors they become even more 
powerful. 
2.        Threatening Symbols 
Obviously, with the rise of nationalism came the highlighting of group differences 
and the rise of threatening symbols. To draw attention to differences, groups used not only 
symbols, but gestures, clothing and language. Over time, many of these were consciously 
used to send messages to other groups. Threatening symbols continue to play a major role 
in inter-ethnic relations; though not all groups are equally well equipped. 
One could argue that Bosnian Muslims did not fare so well in this last Balkan war 
because they lacked a strong ethnic identity. The Bosnian Muslims had religion, but it was 
a religion that most Bosnian Muslims downplayed to a significant extent. Religion per se 
was not as strong a mobilizer or rallying cry as religion combined with a common ethnic 
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background and history, which the Serbs and Croats both had.   This notion was first 
expressed to me by my Bosnian Muslim interpreter who stated that, before the war, if a 
Croat or Serb farmer needed a tractor for his crops he turned to a Croat or a Serb and knew 
he could borrow a tractor. A Bosnian Muslim farmer could never be sure he would be lent 
a tractor if he turned to another Bosnian Muslim farmer. 
Taking this lack of unity into account, there were only a few symbols that Bosnian 
Muslims used. The most common were the Crescent and the Star and the color green - the 
color of Islam. These symbols were used, but never as extensively and energetically as 
were Croat and Serb symbols by Croats and Serbs. Part of the reason for the scarcity of 
these Bosnian Muslim symbols relates to how the Bosnian Muslims wanted to be 
perceived: as modern Europeans, not Middle Easterners. Muslim symbols were not just 
threatening to Serbs and Croats, but to westerners in general. Bosnian Muslim hesitancy to 
deploy ethnic symbols might also help explain the Bosnian Muslims initial lack of unity 
and mobilization (Sudetic, 1998, p. 16). 
The Croats have the checkerboard shield. Although this shield dates back to the 
original Croatian Kingdoms, it is also the symbol used to represent the Ustase. To relate it 
to something that Europeans or Americans understand, Croatians flaunting the 
checkerboard shield is akin to the German nation re-adorning itself with swastikas; there 
could not be anything more 'in your face' or threatening. Nor is this checkerboard shield 
just seen on rare occasions. Instead, it is plastered on all things Croatian, from tombstones 
to Croatian city halls to the Croatian national flag. 
The Serbs have an equally old symbol that they utilize: the Cetri "C". This is a 
symbol that translates as "Four Ss". The symbol is actually a cross with a Cyrillic C in each 
comer. Each individual C stands for a Serbian word. Together they comprise the phrase: 
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"Only Unity can Save the Serbs". This saying is very revealing of the Serb mentality, 
which can be summarized as 'the world is against us, we must stand together'. Just like the 
Croat Shield, the Cetri C has been plastered everywhere. In a sense, the Serbs are luckier 
then the Croats because a cross with four Cs is much easier to spray-paint than is a red and 
white checkerboard. Some of the most telling scenes in the Balkans are of villages, which 
have been entirely destroyed except for one or two homes that have the Cetri C spray- 
painted on the door. Thus is reminiscent of lamb's blood protecting Jews on Passover. 
Another means by which ethnic groups in Bosnia have separated themselves is 
through language. The first linguistic difference that is most evident to an outsider is the 
removal of the Cyrillic alphabet from Croatian and Bosnian Muslim areas. The Cyrillic 
alphabet is strongly associated with Serbs and Serbia. In the late 1980s both the Croats and 
Bosnian Muslims adopted the Latin alphabet in their schools and on any type of street sign; 
the Serbs retained the Cyrillic alphabet. Prior to the rise of nationalism both alphabets 
were taught side-by-side and all federal signs were written in Cyrillic. Also, prior to the 
advent of nationalism the language was called Serbo-Croat. As is normally the case when 
nationalism begins to take hold, language plays a key role. There was a concerted effort on 
both sides to make certain words Croatian words and certain words Serbian words. The 
Bosnian Muslims, meanwhile, began to use many old Turkish and Arabic words to set 
themselves apart, many with religious connotations. These efforts have been so successful 
even given such a short period of time that just recently the Serbian and Croatian languages 
have been recognized as two separate languages by the US government. 
Belonging to an ethnic group as nationalism is on the rise is like being a member of 
a select society whose members recognize each other via special gestures - gestures that 
not only your side, but all sides might understand. When a Serb waves his hand to say 
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hello he only uses three fingers, including his thumb. This symbolizes the three fingers 
members of the Serbian Orthodox church use to make the sign of the cross. The Croats and 
Bosnian Muslims used the V sign, probably as much to imitate the western "V for victory 
sign" as much as any thing else. 
Clothing can also become a distinguisher, especially clothing that has religious 
overtones, i.e. Bosnian Muslim men started to wear blue berets and Croats would wear all 
black on certain days. Even a crucifix is a discriminator: the Orthodox crucifix (worn 
around the neck) has a much higher horizontal bar than the Catholic variant. These gestures 
and clothing may not seem to be threatening in and of themselves, but all symbolize the 
extent to which groups are attempting to distinguish themselves from others. 
3.        Negative Stereotypes 
The former Yugoslavia is rich with prejudices and stereotypes. This seems to result 
from citizens identifying themselves with an ethnic group versus as individuals. If a person 
first thinks of him or herself as a Serb or Croat his/her individual identity is immediately 
tied to a group identity. If Serbs and Croats think about themselves in terms of their group 
identity it only makes sense that they think about members of other ethnic groups in the 
same way, with members of other groups sharing certain characteristics, some good, some 
bad. Americans have a tough time understanding this. For Americans, who classify groups 
of people by citing positive characteristics - "they work hard" - these amount to "cultural 
traits". Negative traits like, considering all members of Group X lazy, are considered 
stereotypes and are frowned upon. People of the former Yugoslavia don't make such 
distinctions. 
One of the most common perceptions of Serbs is that they are drunken buffoons 
(Daalder, 2000, p. 79) - even though this is a case of the pot calling the kettle black since 
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there is no shortage of drink or drinking in any Bosnian ethnic group. Another view of 
Serbs is that they are xenophobic and are interested in a Greater Serbia: however, there are 
numerous Croats who are outspoken racial purists and just as hungry for empire as are the 
Serbs (Sudetic, 1998, p. 80). The major way in which Serbs are stereotyped, and the one I 
heard most often, is that they are militaristic; they glorify their past battles, whether these 
ended in victory or defeat. Serbs, as it happens, also made up a large percentage of the 
JNA's officer corps- not through conspiracy, but though desire. There is a Serbian saying 
that a man only has four parties in his life: when he is born, when he becomes a soldier, 
when he marries, and when he dies. To Serbs it is a big deal to serve in the military. At the 
same time, this militarism also makes Serbs seem more threatening and intimidating. Even 
during the war there was a perception that Serbs were ten feet tall. Also, after the war, 
when traveling to the Republica Serbska, my Muslim interpreters, whether male or female, 
would become physically uneasy, even with large numbers of Americans present. I should 
add that this was not true of Serbs traveling in Muslim areas. In fact, the mere mention of 
certain Serb leaders was sometimes enough to send Muslims and Croats fleeing (Mueller, 
2000, p. 53). 
The Serbs did not regard their militaristic image as a bad thing: instead, it was 
actually cultivated and nurtured as a type of psychological operation to intimidate 
opponents. Serbs did this prior to the war by trying to get what they wanted via threat, and 
during the war through fear and intimidation. Whether the Serbs were as great a military 
people as they and others thought is questionable, but the perception is what counts. This 
militaristic stereotype definitely intimidated members of other ethnic groups prior to, 
during, and after the war. 
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In stark contrast, Muslims and Serbs perceived the Croats as a cultured people. The 
Croats were thought to be the best musicians, poets, and lovers. They were also perceived 
to be sneaky and double dealers not to be trusted. The thing heard most about Croats is that 
they were in league with the Germans. The thing that really stuck in most Serbs' minds 
about the Croats still related to WWE. From the Serb point of view all Croats were Ustase 
interested in a Greater Croatia with no place for Serbs. 
Numerous unflattering stereotypes were used to describe Muslims. The first, and 
possibly the most damning, held by Serbs and Croats is that all Muslims used to be Serbs 
or Croats, but sold out their original ethnicity and religion in order to receive preferential 
treatment from the Turks. The second damning stereotype is that, due to their different 
religion, Bosnian Muslims are all fundamentalists bent on creating a Muslim state in the 
heart of Europe. This never seemed true, but the more a group of people are marginalized 
the more they do turn to religion. Thus, the more the Muslims rediscovered religion the 
more the Serbs and Croats pointed to them as fundamentalists. Corollary to this view is the 
view that Muslims were attempting to gain control of Bosnia by out-breeding the Serbs and 
Croats. It is a matter of fact that Bosnian Muslims did have a higher birthrate than did 
Serbs or Croats. 
A third stereotype was that Muslims were uneducated and ignorant. This grew out 
of the fact that, prior to Tito's rule the Muslim religion did not require women to attend 
school. This also became a problem during Tito's reign and numerous Muslim men were 
punished for not sending their daughters to school (Sudetic, 1998, p. 42). The view of 
Bosnian Muslims being dumb led to numerous jokes about their mental capacity; the jokes 
are very similar to "Polish" jokes in the US. 
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In conclusion, there is enough evidence to easily show that inter-ethnic tensions 
existed in Bosnia prior to the 1992 war. In comparison to other ethnic wars, Bosnia 
probably possessed the most easily exploitable history. Although there were other factors, 
as we will see, in the hands of the right men the precondition of historical tension did not 
take long to ignite. 
C.       ECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS 
The economic pre-conditions that helped Bosnia slip into turmoil are seldom 
brought up, but are just as important as any other contributing factor. Without the 
destabilizing effects of unemployment, inflation, and falling incomes there most likely 
would have been no war. In order to examine the economic conditions that contributed to 
Bosnia's collapse one needs to go back to the rule of Tito and understand how the policies 
he instituted gave the Yugoslav people a false sense of security. Finally, when individuals 
in the Yugoslav government understood the problems and attempted to fix them they faced 
insurmountable obstacles from within and without. The entire spectrum of a flawed 
economic policy, combined with drastic attempts to correct the problem, had the effect of 
creating an unstable and insecure environment for all of Yugoslavia. 
Tito's economic and political policies after 1948 were based upon profiting from 
the animosity and distrust between the Soviet Union and the United States. Yugoslavia 
belonged to neither of these camps, but benefited from both. Not being accepted in a 
bipolar cold war bloc, Tito created, and eventually became the leader of, the 77-member 
unaligned nations movement. As an unaligned nation and with its geo-strategic location 
Yugoslavia received huge amounts of aid from both East and West. During the period of 
the cold war the Yugoslav people did quite well. Their borders were generally open. They 
possessed the highest standard of living of any socialist country. And they were on the 
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same level as Europeans in various democracies. Also, since Yugoslavia did not possess 
strict population control measures its people were free to travel and work in other parts of 
Europe. Tito sent advisors and workers to all parts of the world. These advisors were 
highly sought and provided technical and military expertise to many nations of differing 
political ideologies. The bottom line was that many Yugoslavs traveled extensively and 
understood where Yugoslavia fit on the world's political and economic stage. 
The tide began to turn in the 1970s, when Yugoslavia's social and economic 
policies could no longer be sustained. The period between 1970 and 1980 is when 
problems first became apparent. They went unnoticed in the 1970s because the entire 
world was suffering a recession, but looking back this is when the flawed system began to 
unravel. The unemployment, inflation, and all the other harbingers of a negative economic 
future began to show themselves. Yet, these indicators remained essentially ignored until 
after Tito's death in 1981. 
An institutional legacy of Tito's Yugoslavia was a Federal Government that was 
extremely weak and was continually weakened over time, especially given changes to the 
Yugoslav constitution in 1963 and 1973. The real power lay in the six Republics. This 
created many economic problems because the Federal Government had trouble enforcing 
its rule, especially in the banking sector. Due to her failed economic policies, Yugoslavia 
accumulated serious debt and could not pay off her loans. There was much argument 
within the Federal Government about how to fix the problem. In the 1980s the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other creditors would not loan Yugoslavia any 
more money until the nation strengthened the federal system and enacted serious-market 
based reforms. 
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Yugoslav politicians felt they had two choices: implement reform or suffer under 
stifling debt. They chose reform. As with many great plans and strategies, the 
implementation of market-based reform had unintended consequences. The unintended 
consequences inflicted upon the Yugoslav economy and Yugoslav psyches turned out to be 
very severe (much as has been the economic suffering brought on by Russia's entry into the 
market). Problems such as unemployment and increases in inflation, which was 100% in 
1987 and 150% in 1988, spawned yet other problems (Ramat, 1996, p. 9). 
Since each of the Six Republics was basically responsible for its own economy, 
each tried to develop its own niche. Because of geography and a history linking them to 
the Hapsburg Dynasty, Slovenia and Croatia were already better adapted to the changes 
that market-based reforms required, especially in terms of trade with the West. These 
Republics had much lower unemployment rates than the remaining four Republics, which 
were focused on mining, agriculture, and trade with Eastern Europe. From 1979 to 1990 
Slovenia had an unemployment rate of less than four percent while for the same time 
period unemployment rates in Serbia, Bosnia, and Macedonia were generally all between 
20 and 30 percent (Woodward, 1995, p. 53). This difference in prosperity led to a great 
deal of animosity between the rich and poor Republics. This may have led to a feeling in 
Slovenia and Croatia that the remainder of Yugoslavia was economic dead weight. 
The weakest of the six Republics economically, Bosnia was the last in every facet 
of economic measurement during Yugoslavia's existence. The only place which 
continuously did worse economically was the autonomous province of Kosovo. The only 
time that any money was pumped into Bosnia was in the late 1940s when invasion by the 
Soviets seemed imminent. Then, large factories were built in Bosnia with the idea that this 
central province, with its mountainous terrain deep in the interior of Yugoslavia, would be 
19 
the location from which to wage the war. After the Soviet threat dissipated Bosnia again 
slipped off the radar screen. Although many factories were built in Bosnia, most were 
unsound. An example of such a factory was in Gracanic, where a plant was built to process 
bauxite from a newly discovered, nearby mine. In the typical irresponsible fashion of the 
time it was later discovered that the mine did not produce the high-grade bauxite necessary 
for processing at the factory. 
Another factor working against Bosnia was simple geography. Unlike every other 
Republic in Yugoslavia, Bosnia had no foreign neighbors to trade with. She was engulfed 
by her neighboring Republics and possessed no significant outlet to the sea. These factors 
alone could account for much of Bosnia's economic trouble. 
But worse, the economic reforms asked for by foreign creditors proved an invitation 
to political disintegration. These reforms required that the federal government reduce its 
own power at a moment in time when the country was going through rapid change and 
needed civil order and stability. Without a stable civil and legal order, the social conditions 
created by economic changes can be explosive. Consider the combination of large-scale 
unemployment among youth and unskilled urban workers; demobilized soldiers and 
security police looking to employ their skills; an atmosphere conducive to black market 
activities and crime; easy access to huge stockpiles of weapons and ammunition 
(Woodward, 1995, p. 17). With this air of uncertainty and instability hanging over the 
country, communities were pushed closer together. They became closer because what they 
had depended on before - a government that could be counted on to provide subsistence, 
employment, and protection - was becoming radically narrowed in scope. It is only natural 
then that, in Bosnia, with the disintegration of the existing social and economic systems, 
communal ethnic ties became stronger and stronger. 
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C.       ECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS 
In Bosnia we see a combination of perceived political and ethnic repression and a 
decaying and unworkable system, compounded by a scramble for power and security. 
These were the main political contributions to the war in Bosnia, where there also 
happened to be an almost evenly divided ethnic mix. 
To comprehend what happened in Yugoslavia and Bosnia it is useful to understand 
the purposes served by individual and ethnic identity. Contrary to what some believe, Tito 
did not suppress an individual's ethnic identity in any way. He did not tolerate ethnic 
nationalism or intolerance of another's race or religion; actions of this sort were prosecuted 
and treated as threats to the state. Yet, the use of ethnic identity was integral to all things 
Yugoslav: ethnic identity was marked on census documents, school and military records, 
birth and marriage certificates, and most other official documents. All federal positions 
were rotated among the ethnicities and government jobs were allocated by representative 
ethnicity. Essentially, there were ethnic quotas and formulas for all levels of governance. 
This program was called the National Key (Woodward, 1995, pp. 31). 
This delicate balancing act was implemented because Yugoslavia was basically a 
nation of minorities. The founding ethnicities of Yugoslavia - Croats, Macedonians, 
Montenegrins, Serbs, and Slovenes (ethnic Muslims after 1963) - each had their own 
geographic Republics, but each dominant ethnic group had to deal with minorities within 
these Republics. In order to make all these minorities feel secure Tito went to great lengths 
to ensure that all ethnicities were treated equally, especially minority ethnicities in majority 
republics. This was done via a concept of dual citizenship; an individual was a citizen of 
Yugoslavia, but also a member of an ethnic nation. This was also the case for ethnicities 
21 
that did not have a home Republic in Yugoslavia, such as Albanians, Hungarians, Jews, 
Gypsies, Russians, Bulgarians, and Turks. They had rights as nationalities. 
The unintended consequence of all this ethnic gerrymandering was that the system 
never encouraged anyone to become a Yugoslav. The system always encouraged people to 
retain their old ethnic identities. This can be seen clearly in the Yugoslav census data. For 
Yugoslavia as a whole, from 1961 to 1991, the highest percentage of people who 
considered themselves to be Yugoslav was 5.4 percent in 1981. For Bosnia 8.4 percent 
was the highest - and that was in 1961. It is no wonder that when things went 
economically wrong there was little sense of Yugoslav unity. The belief in a Yugoslav 
nation was quickly and easily discarded in favor of forming ethnic communities 
(Woodward, 1996, pp. 32-35). 
As was stated earlier in the chapter, the Yugoslav federal government was a fairly 
weak institution. As economic and market reforms were implemented power and decision 
making were pushed down to the Republics, until eventually they had power rivaling that 
of the Yugoslav federal government. The Republics, namely Croatia and Serbia, began to 
push the idea that minorities in the Republics did not have the same rights as members of 
the majority ethnicities. This was done through mass firings of individuals belonging to 
non-majority ethnicities, the administering of loyalty oaths, and curbs on minority cultural 
rights. This was an extreme change from the Yugoslav ideal of "Brotherhood and Unity" 
guaranteed by the Yugoslav federal government. Almost identical examples of this can be 
seen in the way that the Republic of Serbia treated its Albanian minority in Kosovo and the 
way that Croatia treated its Serb minority in the Krajina. This stripping of minority power 
led to a feeling of insecurity and political inequality. It is also interesting to note that in 
many other places in the world this loss of minority power would be met by calls for 
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minority rights and equal representation. In Yugoslavia it was met by calls for minority 
autonomous zones. This reaction reveals a strong fear on the part of all in Yugoslavia of 
being a minority in Yugoslavia. To quote a recent Yugoslav saying " Why should I be a 
minority in your country when you can be a minority in mine?" 
As for Bosnia, its political slide can be said to have started with a major change to 
the constitution that took place in 1963. This change granted the ethnic Muslims (mostly 
centered in Bosnia) status as an ethnic people in Yugoslavia. Obviously this title or status 
was something that was highly sought after by the Muslim population. Prior to this time 
they had been forced to identify themselves as Yugoslavs, Serbs, or Croats. This 
identification always led elements in Croatia and Serbia to claim Bosnia on the grounds 
that Muslims were either converted Croats or Serbs. It is interesting to note that the 
impetus for granting the Muslim population this "new" identity was the fact that the 
Muslims played a large role in Tito's non-aligned movement. For obvious reasons 
members of the Muslim population were chosen as Tito's representatives to the Middle 
Eastern countries. Once these representatives saw the vital role they were playing they 
demanded that their ethnicity be recognized. 
This recognition of the Muslim ethnicity led the way to friction between Serbs and 
Muslims. The Republic of Serbia and the Serb population in Bosnia had always seen 
themselves as dominating Bosnia, but now the Serb population faced a new political rival: 
the ethnic Muslims. This new political conflict bubbled beneath the surface until other 
factors, such as the economy, began to give way. Then this political fault line began to 
show. 
It was the stripping of minority rights and the perverting of Yugoslav ideals and the 
Yugoslav federal government that led to the next stage in the destruction of Yugoslavia and 
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Bosnia. Although it is not perfectly clear when exactly the political entrepreneurs first 
started taking advantage of these various fissures, they soon proved unstoppable in this 
environment of insecurity. These individuals ratcheted up the tension and inflamed the 
situation instead of de-escalating it to a manageable level. 
D.        RISE OF POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 
The rise of political entrepreneurs and the destruction of Yugoslavia and Bosnia are 
intimately connected. The nationalists' politics of confrontation and no comprise, along 
with the attitude that the final solution would be handled militarily, led to the destruction of 
the country. There is a question as to whether the people of Yugoslavia wanted these 
nationalists in power or whether these leaders snuck in under the radar and hijacked the 
nation. But, interestingly, democratic elections played a key role in this process - six 
months after Yugoslavia's election the nation was at war. How did these entrepreneurs 
gain power and what was their aim? 
I believe that the conditions were just right for the rise of political entrepreneurs in 
Yugoslavia. As I mentioned before, the groundwork for these leaders to arise had already 
been laid: a history of ethnic tension, a depressed and unstable economy, and developing 
political tensions and inequalities. The other elements that came into line that allowed 
these entrepreneurs to come to power were a system that was in collapse, a loss of faith in 
the federal government and the Yugoslav ideal, and the inability of the federal government 
to provide security and welfare. Combine this with the fact that Communism in Eastern 
Europe was disintegrating at a phenomenal rate and Yugoslavia overnight lost all the 
geopolitical clout it once had. When this happened people found the idea of nationalist 
leaders very comforting. In saying this, of course, we should always bear in mind that a 
nationalist political approach comes with a ready-made platform, and requires nothing 
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complicated, and nothing new, but instead borrows from what everyone belonging to the 
same ethnicity can already relate to. Such were the circumstances, the lure, and the 
simplicity that allowed the nationalists to step on to the scene in Yugoslavia. 
1.        The Leaders 
Obviously the man who most Americans would argue is the architect of the 
destruction of Yugoslavia is Slobodan Milosevic. He was an ambitious man who in the 
midl980s became the Belgrade Communist party boss, working his way up and becoming 
the Serbian Communist Party boss and eventually the Serbian President. He consolidated 
power in the Serbian Republic by stripping the autonomous zones of Kosovo and 
Vojvodina of their status and gaining control of politics in Montenegro. He used Serb 
nationalism as his vehicle. It is impossible to determine whether Milosevic was a true Serb 
nationalist or an opportunist with a successful platform. I think he was probably a little bit 
of both depending on the time and circumstances. It cannot be denied that at certain times 
Milosevic had the full support of the Serb people, especially in his dealings with Kosovo 
(Ramat, 1996, p. 27). 
I believe that as Milosevic spent more time in power he became more of a true Serb 
nationalist. He was usually rational and seldom acted emotionally or out of control. 
Americans, such as Warren Zimmerman, our last ambassador to Yugoslavia, argue that 
Milosevic was an evil opportunist possessed by his dark side (Zimmerman, 1999, pp. 22- 
25). However, I believe that Milosevic usually acted in a way that he thought served the 
best interests of the Serb people. In his mind he tried to save Yugoslavia, but only on his 
terms. Once he saw that Yugoslavia was going down the road to breakup he immediately 
resigned himself to the idea that he should do everything possible to ensure that Serbs 
living outside of the Serbian Republic were safe and had equal rights. To Milosevic that 
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meant annexing the territory in which they lived, or guaranteeing its autonomy. If he did 
not act violently to protect Serbs' interests then the Croats, the Albanians, or the Muslims 
would beat them to the punch. To most Serbs in the early 1990s this didn't seem like a bad 
idea (Zimmerman, 1999, p. 17). 
Franjo Tudjman, the elected leader of the Republic of Croatia, was, without a doubt, 
a rabid Croat nationalist of the narrowest sort. An ex-JNA general and member of the 
communist party, Tudjman had, in the 1970s, spent time in jail for inciting Croat 
nationalism. He was elected to power with less than 42% of the vote on an anti- 
communist, anti-Serb, and pro-independence platform. Upon election he immediately 
embarked on a very confrontational approach with the Serb minority in Croatia, extremely 
similar to the earlier approach taken by Milosevic with the Albanian minority in Kosovo - 
violating Serb rights, dismissing Serbs from government and press jobs, and requiring them 
to take loyalty oaths (Zimmerman, 1999, pp. 73-75). These moves were akin to throwing 
gasoline on a kitchen fire. 
In Bosnia herself the 1990 elections for Republic representatives broke down 
almost exactly along ethnic lines in proportion to the population: 33.8% for the SDA (Party 
of Democratic Action), the party of Islam, led by Alija Izetbegovic; 29.6 for Radovon 
Karadzic SDS (Serb Democratic Party) the party that represents Serbs outside of Serbia 
(the same party with which Krajina Serbs identify); 18.3% for the HDZ (party for Croatian 
Unity), the same party as Tudjman's in Croatia. All of the above mentioned leaders were 
strong nationalists. Izetbegovic, for instance, spent years in prison as a consequence of his 
Muslim nationalist leanings.  However, the voting patterns do not tell us exactly what the 
people of Bosnia were trying to prove. Was a vote for a nationalist party a vote against 
Yugoslavia, a vote for independence, a vote against another ethnic group, or a vote 
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promoting one's own ethnic group? It is impossible to know because elections were never 
held again in the complete version of Yugoslavia. What these voting records do say is that 
when times are bad people elect or associate themselves with those who they believe will 
best protect their interests. In Bosnia these chosen people were the nationalists. 
(Woodward, 1995, pp. 119-122) 
2.        The Election 
An interesting note related to the ascendance of these nationalists and the elections 
is that when most Americans think of democratic elections they associate the term with a 
concept of a democratic system. This was not the case in Yugoslavia, where people were 
not prepared to abide by the election results. It was not a popular uprising or revolution by 
the common people that had put elections on the schedule in the first place. Instead, it was 
the politicians. It seems that politicians saw opportunity in the breakdown of communism 
and, given the declining confidence in the system, decided to call for elections. These 
politicians, being excellent judges of human nature, knew that during periods of uncertainty 
people vote along nationalist lines, which is what they indeed did in all the Republics. The 
Croatian nationalist - Tudjman - only received 40% of the vote in Croatia; however, he 
took power and executed nationalist policies nonetheless. I will again say that it is 
impossible to read people's intent in their votes. But clearly the election demonstrates that 
nationalism holds a very strong appeal during uncertain times and politicians are willing to 
take advantage ofthat. It also shows that during these times nationalist parties appeal 
strongly to politicians. The nationalist parties were made up of mostly ex-communist 
politicians who tried to pick a winner. There were other smaller parties that reached across 
ethnic lines, but they never made it off the ground. 
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I believe that the record shows that most people in Bosnia voted nationalist because 
of the instability and collapse which was going on around them. No politician mentioned, 
as part of his platform, that he was willing to destroy Yugoslavia. The people of 
Yugoslavia wanted security, not civil war. The nationalist politicians, every one of whom 
(except Izetbegovic) had been a Communist politician a few years before, took their 
election as a mandate for independence, oppression of minority rights, and conquest. The 
situation is reminiscent of a rich dying uncle (Yugoslavia) with many unscrupulous 
relatives (political entrepreneurs) fighting over how to split the inheritance between 
families. Could the situation in Yugoslavia and Bosnia have been defused and de-escalated 
by these elected officials? I believe the answer is yes. De-escalation would have been very 
difficult but it could have been achieved. However, instead of a conciliatory and unifying 
approach, the nationalist leaders took a very aggressive, no compromise stance involving a 
deliberate campaign of fear, propaganda, distortion, and hate that was the final set piece 
before open war could begin. 
E.        MASS HOSTILITY 
All the preconditions in the world are not enough to start a war. It usually takes 
some very extreme circumstance to cause a man to want to kill or do damage to members 
of another ethnic group with whom he has lived, in peace for decades. For the purposes of 
this thesis I will call this state of mind Mass Hatred, a condition that induces complete 
dehumanization of, and contempt for, the perceived enemy. There were three main reasons 
for the development of an atmosphere of mass hatred in Bosnia: the first was an unstable 
environment brought on by wars in the surrounding Republics, the second was a steady 
stream of propaganda, the third was instigating tactics promulgated by criminal and 
paramilitary gangs. 
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I will address first the issue of instability and war surrounding Bosnia. Bosnia not 
only had to deal with its own history of ethnic turmoil, a very bad economy, and the 
question of secession, but several different conflicts were being fought along its borders. 
First, there was conflict in Slovenia between the JNA and the breakaway Slovenes; 
although the fight was short the conflict opened the door to complete destabilization in the 
region. Second was the war in Croatia. Bosnia was used as a staging area for the JNA, 
with intense fighting going on along the border with Bosnia. What was perhaps most 
important about this conflict was that, unlike the war in Slovenia, this conflict pitted Serbs 
against Croats: two of the major ethnicities in Bosnia. The third and possibly the most 
important realm of instability was in the Krajina where Serbs were the targets of Croat 
nationalism and later fought and declared a Serb Autonomous Zone in Croatia. Although 
some might argue about the Serb reaction, the initial threat to Krajina Serbs was legitimate; 
the complicating factor for Bosnia was that this trouble was happening directly along its 
western border where there was a large concentration of Serbs. Many Serbs in Croatia and 
the Krajina became refugees and settled in Bosnia with friends or relatives. These 
refugees, just like any who lose their home, have an ax to grind and little to lose. These 
refugees also lacked the social ties to local Croats and Muslims that many Bosnian Serbs 
had, therefore instigating violence was easier for them. Not surprisingly, Serbs in Bosnia 
were affected by what happened in the Krajina such that they too declared an autonomous 
zone and then fought to keep it. It is fairly obvious that the actions in Krajina added to 
their immediate fear and mistrust of other ethnicities. Given what happened or appeared 
likely to happen to Serbs in the Krajina, Serbs in Bosnia were bound to feel that their only 
chance at security - for their culture, ethnicity and possibly their lives - lay in autonomy. 
The end result was the sense that if they didn't immediately band together and defend 
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themselves they would be exterminated. These feelings were fueled by a healthy dose of 
propaganda and dredging up of the past. 
Obviously, television and radio advertising work, so why not use these mediums 
of communication to unite your ethnic group and intimidate your rivals? This was exactly 
what the leaders of the Republics and other ethnic leaders did in Bosnia. These individuals 
controlled their respective state's radio and television and they used them to rally 
supporters. The method was to take an incident that happened - no matter how or who 
started it - and make it look like your side was minding its own business while the other 
side was the unprovoked aggressor. This amounts to spin gone wild. Many such events 
were premeditated and carefully planned by the instigating side with the intent of 
propagandizing and portraying their side as victims or martyrs. It was all about getting 
your side's story across. 
There are some skeptics who would claim that people have common sense and will 
realize that they are being manipulated, but I would argue that even the most intelligent 
among us would have difficulty not being swayed by the messages people in Bosnia 
received. Some of the messages were mixed with historical fact. There were, for instance, 
film clips of Croat Ustase leaders meeting with Hitler, followed by a clip with Croat 
soldiers wearing the same insignia today as they were in WWII. The message was clear: 
these people are the same and they will do the same thing to us all over again if we do not 
act first. I believe there are very few people who this message would not affect; it is 
grounded in enough truth to make anyone think twice and to make anyone feel insecure. 
It struck me while in Bosnia that the truth was devoid of meaning and that people 
could no longer take an objective view. Outright, boldfaced lying about the perceived 
enemy was normal everyday discourse and most people believed what they heard, as long 
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as it was negative and it was about the other side. Such propaganda also becomes self- 
reinforcing. The more the story grows and the wider it spreads the more it takes on the 
semblance of truth or fact. It amazed me how the members of one ethnic group to a person 
believed one version of events while members of another ethnic group offered a totally 
different explanation. These views were often expressed as if individuals were reading a 
script or reciting the party line. The influence of propaganda in Bosnia demonstrates why 
we can never afford to doubt the power of radio or television to influence people or make 
neighbor distrust neighbor. 
The final step in the polarization of ethnic groups was the paramilitary influence. If 
a spontaneous uprising doesn't occur, as often happens, then something else is needed. 
That something in Bosnia was paramilitary attacks. The most famous one happened in the 
eastern Bosnian town of Bijelina in early 1992. Arkan, the most feared of all Serb 
paramilitary leaders, approaching from inside Serbia, attacked the town, and brutally 
executed many of its Muslim inhabitants. Serbs justified this in terms of liberating the 
town and protecting the resident Serbs from Muslim aggression. Both sides thus had 
reason to believe they were in danger. Reprisals began. More paramilitaries formed. Law 
and order broke down. And the area spiraled into war. At the same time, in the western 
portions of Bosnia near the Krajina, ethnic war was being fomented by similar techniques: 
staged incidents, invited crackdowns, while gun battles with local police eventually drew in 
the JNA which usually aided the Serb side. 
Events such as these leave little room for people not to pick a side. Then with 
everyone suddenly polarized and feeling that if they don't fight they will surely be 
massacred - as so many in the past had been - the groundwork is laid. Open warfare is in 
progress. 
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III.      KOSOVO 
A.       HISTORY OF ETHNIC TENSION 
"No Balkan society is immune from the observation that a nation is a group of 
people united by common error about their ancestry and common dislike of their neighbor" 
(Hall, 1994, p. 25). A history of ethnic tension between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs is not 
complete without this comment. Nowhere else is the aforementioned idea more important 
than between these two ethnic groups over this one territory. This portion of the paper is 
rather simple because, unlike the other ethnicities in the remainder of Yugoslavia, there has 
never really been a time in the last 300 years that Kosovar Albanians have ever gotten 
along with, or wanted to be a part of, Serbia or Yugoslavia, and Serbs harbor the same 
negative feelings towards Albanians.   I have broken down the remainder of this portion of 
the chapter about historical tension into three parts: history of domination, threatening 
symbols, and negative stereotypes. 
1.        Fear of Domination 
As far back as historical memories go, both sides involved in this dispute have 
believed that Kosovo belongs to them. The Kosovar Albanians believe that they were the 
first inhabitants of the area, through their ancestors, the Illyrians, who lived in Kosovo in 
the 2nd century B.C. Kosovo is also important to Albanians because it was the birthplace of 
modem Albanian nationalism with an event heralding the League of Prizren in 1878. 
Another key factor to remember about Kosovo is that currently the state of Albania has 
about 3 million people; 98 percent are ethnic Albanians. Kosovo holds 2 million ethnic 
Albanians, the largest number of ethnic Albanians outside Albania. This is important 
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because Kosovar Albanians subscribe to the old adage that "possession is nine tenths of 
ownership". 
From the Serb point of view, on the other hand, Kosovo is a historic holy place, 
their Jerusalem of sorts. Kosovo is the ancient home to numerous Serbian Orthodox 
shrines and monasteries. Kosovo was the place where Serbian Kings were crowned. 
Kosovo Polje, where Prince Lazar was defeated by the Turks (with help from Albanians) in 
1389, is located in Kosovo. Serbs trace the formation of modern Serbia back to this defeat. 
There is no doubt that Kosovo holds a large amount of intrinsic value to Serbs. But in 1991, 
after years of demographic decline, they made up only 10 percent of Kosovo's population. 
Throughout the history of the region both ethnicities have had reason to fear 
domination by the other. One side's fear is just as real as the other's. I will start with the 
Kosovo Albanians. In the Balkan wars of 1912, Serbia took control of Kosovo from the 
Ottomans. The first thing Serbia did was declare there were no other ethnicities in Kosovo, 
and thereby continued a policy of forced expulsions. These forced expulsions have helped 
rearrange the historical landscape of Kosovo through the centuries. Kosovo has been a 
pressure release valve or frontier where Serbs, expelled from other areas, most recently 
from the Krajina in 1995, could resettle at the expense of Kosovo Albanians. The Albanian 
language, banned by Serbs, but extremely important to Albanians everywhere, was 
forbidden in Kosovo until the Austrians took over in WWI. This was a short-lived event 
and after the war Kosovo was again granted to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which was run 
by Serbia. It is interesting to note that the word Yugoslavia means "South Slavs" or the 
"Kingdom of South Slavs". Albanians are not Slavic and they are fiercely protective of 
there national identity. Albanian is not a Slavic language, nor is it related to any other 
European language, it is in a language group by itself (Hall, 1994, p.29). 
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Once the Kingdom of Yugoslavia took power the Kosovar Albanians found 
themselves literally and figuratively muzzled. Serbs re-colonized the area while a Kosovo 
Albanian insurgency against the Yugoslav Kingdom raged into the late 1920s (Vickers, 
1998, p. 102). This rebellion was rife with massacres on both sides that make the 1999 war 
seem like child's play.   During WWII the Germans united Kosovo with Albania, creating 
the German/Italian puppet state of Greater Albania. Although it is thought that Tito was 
sympathetic to awarding Kosovo to Albania after WWII, he ruled this out because of Serb 
protests (Hall, 1994, p. 204). In 1945 a brutal Albanian rebellion was put down in Kosovo. 
This rebellion lasted six months and by the time it was finished almost 50,000 Kosovar 
Albanians were dead (Vickers, 1998, p. 143). The impetus behind the rebellion in 1945 
was that no Kosovar Albanians - neither Albanian collaborator forces nor Albanian 
communist partisans - wanted to live under Yugoslav rule. And they were willing to fight 
to the bitter end to prevent this. Thus, much as it had at the end of WWI, Kosovo entered 
Yugoslavia essentially under siege, and with an Albanian population under suspicion. 
That being said, Tito did recognize the Albanian ethnicity and allowed the Albanian 
culture and language to exist until 1974, when Kosovo was declared an Autonomous 
Province and granted nearly the power of a Republic. However, even this did not satisfy 
the Kosovar Albanians because they always, at a minimum, wanted to form a separate 
republic. Their ethnic population fluctuated between being the third and fourth largest in 
Yugoslavia. First were the Serbs, second were the Croats, and in a virtual tie for third were 
ethnic Muslims and Albanians. The complaint was that Kosovo Albanians had twice the 
population as some Republics, like Macedonia or Montenegro, but not equal power or 
representation. 
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However, just as Kosovo was finally nearing Republic status, Serbia, in a bid to 
consolidate power in 1989, stripped it of its autonomous status and banned the Albanian 
language and most everything Albanian. For the fourth time since 1945 the JNA occupied 
Kosovo. With such a recent volatile history of forced domination it is a wonder that open 
warfare between Serbs and Kosovar Albanians did not break out sooner. 
From a Serbian perspective, the Serbs felt they had as much to fear from Kosovo 
Albanians as Albanians did from them. Going back to the 14th Century, Serbs blame the 
loss at Kosovo Polje on Albanians, who helped the Turks. The truth seems a bit less clear- 
cut; Albanians fought on both sides, but as is often the case in the Balkans, historical facts 
get overrun by a selective version of historical spin. There are also historical examples 
(especially during the time of the Ottoman rule) of Albanians forcibly expelling Serbs from 
Kosovo. The first of these great Serb expulsions took place in 1690 when Kosovo was 
almost completely emptied of its Serb population. Although anything that took place in 
1690 might seem like ancient history to an American, this association in Serb minds, 
between Albanian Muslims and the hated Ottoman Turks, is very much alive. WWI and 
WWII also add fuel to the historical fire; in Serb minds this recent history shows that, when 
given the chance, ethnic Albanians side with opposing powers. During both World Wars 
Albanians hunted down Serb soldiers and partisans, or massacred or expelled Serb 
civilians. In WWI Kosovo Albanians acted in league with the Austrians; in WWTf they 
collaborated with the Germans and Italians and even formed their own SS Division. More 
recently, fear of domination has come from the fact that Serbs in Kosovo are the local 
minority. The Serb belief that they have been the victims of crime and violence at the hand 
of ethnic Albanians is not without a base in fact. 
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For centuries the blood feud has been the way that Albanian men settled disputes. 
It is estimated that in 1991 over 1000 Kosovar families had vendettas to settle with other 
families (March, 1999, p. 6). Since Ottoman rule, banditry has been a way of life in the 
hard to control mountainous regions of Kosovo. As a consequence Serbs have left the area 
in search of safer places to live. The appeal in 1987, by the Serb Academy of Science, 
which sought to stop the Albanian genocide of Serbs in Kosovo, offers a glimpse of the 
Serb mindset. Every instance of Albanian-on-Serb crime was blown up until there was the 
appearance of a "quiet ethnic cleansing". This, combined with a Kosovar Albanian 
birthrate that was the highest in Europe, gave the impression to Serbs that they were being 
driven out and eventually would lose their cultural identity in the cradle of their 
civilization. 
2.        Threatening Symbols 
There are numerous symbols that strike fear into the hearts of both Serbs and 
Albanians. These symbols also serve as the rallying cry or mobilizer for each ethnic group. 
Threatening symbols have been present on both sides. 
During the recent buildup to conflict the most threatening symbol that Kosovar 
Albanians possessed was the set of initials, UCK. In Albanian these letters stand for 
Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, known better in English as the KLA or Kosovo Liberation 
Army. The letters UCK were, and are, spray painted all over Kosovo. This is intended as 
much to unify the Kosovar Albanians as to strike fear and insecurity into the hearts of 
Serbs. The UCK flies the red and black double-headed eagle flag; the same flag is used by 
the state of Albania and is identical to the one that flew over the WWII puppet state of 
Greater Albania. This can be interpreted a couple of ways. Either Kosovar Albanians are 
in search of a Greater Albania, just like the one they had under German and Italian rule in 
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WWII, and/or, they axe purposely using the double-headed eagle to intimidate, since this 
was the family symbol of Skanderbeg, Albania's greatest hero. Skanderbeg made his name 
fighting for freedom (ironically against the Ottoman Turks). Not uncoincidentally, the 
Skanderbeg SS Division made use of both the name and the flag. So they now evoke all 
sorts of bad memories at a myriad of levels, and particularly for people still alive to 
remember. 
The other threatening symbol is the written and spoken language of Albanian. This 
is the greatest common unifier of Albanians. The Serbs tried to replace Albanian with 
Cyrillic script and the Serbian language, but they failed. And this failure itself- and 
resurgence of Albanian in the face of state repression - made the Albanian language even 
more significant, both literally and symbolically. Even in terms of the name of the region, 
Albanians refuse to call it Kosovo; only the Albanian pronunciation Kosova will do. 
Islam, the primary Albanian religion, was also considered threatening by Serbs, 
though Albanians were never the fundamentalists that Serbs warned against. Nor was 
religion a great unifier for Kosovar Albanians. An interesting fact is that most Albanians 
were forcibly converted to Islam from Roman Catholicism in the late 18th century- a very 
recent memory in the Balkans. In the 1990s a grassroots effort was even made to reconvert 
Albanians back to Roman Catholicism, their ancestral religion.   Thus, although 97 percent 
of Kosovar Albanians remain Muslim, Islam was not used to rally people. Instead the 
resurgence of Kosovar Albanian nationalism was evoked through symbols revolving 
around a common history, language, and culture. 
Serbs, as we saw in the chapter on Bosnia, also use a variety of symbols to evoke 
feelings of nationalism. One of the most common is the three-fingered salute, in which the 
thumb, index finger, and middle finger are extended upwards. All Serbs recognize this 
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gesture, while nothing evokes anger quicker from rival ethnicities. The Cetri C with its 
meaning of Serb unity is also present everywhere: on the Serb flag, government seals, 
spray-painted in Serb areas, and tattooed on Serb soldiers. This symbol is a cross with a 
Cyrillic C in each corner. Together the Cs are an acronym representing a phrase that 
roughly means "only through unity can Serbs survive". The fact that the origins of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church lay in Kosovo add meaning to the religious symbolism, 
especially since along with Serb nationalism there has been a revival of the Serbian 
Orthodox Church. Something else that began to gain popularity among Kosovo Serbs in 
the late 1980s was the growth of long hair and beards- a connection to the Cetnik guerrilla 
fighters of the Ottoman Wars and WWII. Music also played its part with the revival of 
Serb patriotic songs (Vickers, 1998, p. 228). All of these would have seemed menacing to 
non-Serbs who were familiar with Balkan history. 
In terms of more overt threats, after Serbia stripped Kosovo of its autonomy, the 
police force became a Serb force. This was threatening in and of itself, but whenever the 
Serb police (traffic police, special police or interior police) feel they are in a war-type 
setting, they go to an all-purple camouflage uniform. This purple uniform was the standard 
in Kosovo. We referred to it as the "purple people eater suit" in large part because of its 
effect on non-Serbs. This uniform was feared because it was also the uniform that Serbs 
were wearing in locations were they were at war; it was especially associated with units 
which where a combination of Yugoslav FB17Special Forces/anti-terrorists. Along with the 
purple uniform came an increased level of Serb militarization. 
The message sent out about Kosovo to Serbs didn't have to depend solely on a 
display of Serb symbols. Mobilization against Kosovar Albanians also occurred as a result 
of Serbs reading the Albanians a certain way. It did not take much to enrage Serbs or 
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spread the message that "the cradle of Serb culture is being overrun by sub-class Albanian 
Islamists; we must gain control of this area and make it safe for Serbs to inhabit". The 
Serbs got this message across by associating Kosovar Albanians with mosques, poverty, 
overpopulation, the desire for secession, defaced monasteries and cemeteries, and crime 
(especially against Serbs). The resultant images -all negative in Serb eyes- of the Kosovar 
Albanians evoked such a visceral response in the Serb people that these negative symbols 
stood alone and sold themselves. It must be remembered that Milosevic's crackdowns on 
Kosovar Albanians were extremely popular among Serbs; the Serb reduction of Kosovar 
Albanians to a series of negative images and threatening symbols amounted to a call to a 
Serb holy war. 
3.        Negative Stereotypes 
Like symbols, stereotypes were easy to come by for Serbs and Kosovar Albanians. 
Kosovar Albanians, for instance, could easily sum up Serbs and Yugoslavs. Their most 
prevalent stereotype was that Serbs and Yugoslavs are ethno-centrists, racists, and brutal 
militarists, especially after the crackdown in the late 1980s. This view helped achieve the 
almost total alienation of the Albanian population from the very concept of a Yugoslavia 
(Vickers, 1998, p. 226). The claim by Albanians that the Serbs are ethnocentrists is easily 
supported, since every day that the word Yugoslavia is spoken an Albanian is reminded 
that he is not a Slav and that his culture is deemed unworthy. Throughout recent memory 
Serbs and Yugoslavs have sought to muffle the Albanian language and culture. Forced 
expulsions of Albanians from Kosovo is the historic rule, not the exception. 
The view that Serbs are brutal and militaristic is also well founded. Serbs consider 
themselves to be the greatest warriors in the Balkans. This doesn't translate into the idea 
that they are the most noble or show the most mercy to their foes. Rather, the JNA and 
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previous Serb armies have time and again demonstrated that they fight Kosovar Albanian 
rebels the old-fashioned way: via massacre, rape, kidnapping of family members, and 
basically by evicting populations. Related to this is the notion that Serbs would kill to keep 
Kosovo, but refuse to live there. Their current predicament is similar to inner city white 
flight in the US, with the same principles at play: a minority moves in, the minority soon 
becomes the local majority, the area declines, members of the majority grow afraid to 
remain and leave. 
Consequently, Serbs hold Albanians in considerable contempt. They consider 
Albanians to belong to a subclass and regard them as criminal, ignorant, lazy, and 
backwards. None of these negative stereotypes have been mitigated because there are very 
few crosscutting ties linking Albanians and Serbs. There have been few intermarriages and 
very little interaction in the business sphere. 
The view that Kosovar Albanians are criminal goes back centuries to when 
outlaws, especially those seeking sanctuary from vendettas, would escape to Kosovo in 
order to lead a life of banditry in the mountains. The fact that Kosovar Albanians have 
tended to settle disputes through blood feuds leaves the distinct impression that Albanians 
are violent, lawless, and uncivilized. Revenge, not the Yugoslav Judiciary, has been the 
law. Recently, Kosovar Albanians have been purported to be the largest drug traffickers in 
Europe. Keeping this in mind, it is no wonder that Serbs believe that if they lived in 
Kosovo they would be putting themselves at risk of becoming the victims of individual acts 
of violence or of general Albanian unrest. The fact that murders, rapes, and the desecration 
of cemeteries and holy sites occurred only further convinced Serbs Kosovo was unsafe. 
Worse, Albanians actually intimidated Serbs into leaving in order to then buy their land 
cheap. As a consequence it became illegal for Serbs to sell land in Kosovo to Albanians 
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after 1989. Perhaps most telling, even Kosovo Albanian leaders appealed to their 
populations to show restraint towards Kosovo's Serb minority (Vickers, 1998, pp. 219- 
226). 
The view that Albanians are lazy, stupid, and dirty comes from the fact that there is 
a tendency for all former Yugoslavs (Croats, Slovenes, ethnic Muslims) to regard anything 
or anyone coming from southern Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Macedonia, southern Serbia) as 
dirty and backwards. Ethnic Muslims in Bosnia would not eat at Albanian restaurants 
because they claimed, "Albanians were dirty". This prejudice is perhaps best illustrated by 
what happened when the Belgrade government attempted to resettle Krajina Serb refugees 
in Kosovo. Several times bus convoys loaded with these Krajina Serb refugees mutinied 
once they found out, en route, that they were to be relocated to Kosovo (Malcom, 1998, pp. 
353). These strong feelings about Albanians and Kosovo no doubt stem, in part, from the 
fact that the region is the poorest and most underdeveloped part of Yugoslavia. The 
birthrate issue also figures into general disdain. Any group of people that has such a high 
birthrate must be little better than peasants. For a people (e.g. the Serbs) trying to be seen 
as western, this peasant-like birthrate is not only unattractive, but also embarrassing. 
Another powerful belief is that all Albanians want secession.   Albanians are very 
clannish, suspicious of outsiders, and have thus generally been hard for others to trust. The 
secessionist stereotype has been bolstered by the idea that many of the Albanians who live 
in Kosovo came illegally from Albania. It seems to Serbs that Albanians never wanted to 
be part of the Yugoslav system; in 1981, only .02 percent of the Kosovo population 
considered themselves Yugoslavs, the lowest percentage in Yugoslavia (Vickers, 1998, 
p.195). It was easy for Serbs to feel that they were the landlords of Kosovo and the 
Albanians were malcontents and bad renters, begging to be evicted. 
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Even Serbs who lived in Kosovo were considered to be tainted or dirtied by the 
experience. Serbs in Belgrade would call these people "half black", referring to darker 
Albanian skin color, or "mulsmimi", a negative Muslim slur. This was the same term used 
by Serbs commenting on other Serbs who had lived in Sarajevo with ethnic Muslims. The 
rationale was that anyone who lived with a lower ethnicity must have had some of it rub off 
on him or her. 
To Serbs, Albanians are not Slavs in a land of Slavs. Rather, they are indeed 
followers of Islam in the birthplace of the Serbian Orthodox Church. In the Serb view of 
the world, few groups rate lower on the cultural scale than Albanians. Serbs have also tried 
to portray Albanians as rampant Islamic fundamentalists, but as stated earlier, this was 
largely propaganda, designed to stir Serbs to action, or at least garner support for anti- 
Albanian measures. 
The Kosovo example offers a clear-cut case of ethnic tension. There was a definite 
history and fear of domination by both sides. Threatening symbols drawn from history 
were openly, provocatively flaunted. There was little interaction or desire for interaction, 
socially or politically, between the two groups. The stereotypes each side held about the 
other were as bad as one can imagine. Confrontation would have been hard to prevent or 
avoid in Kosovo. 
B.        ECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS 
It is no secret that Kosovo was the most economically backward region in 
Yugoslavia. The area had the highest rates of unemployment and enjoyed the lowest per 
capita incomes during the entire existence of Yugoslavia. This poverty and backwardness 
spawned ideas of secession and self-government. These are very powerful factors in 
themselves, but Kosovo's economic plight also led the Yugoslav government to make a 
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series of critical decisions that affected trade, higher education, and precipitated Serb flight 
from Kosovo. 
The economy in Kosovo has seemingly always been a shambles. The main sources 
of economic dependence in the 20th century have been agriculture and mining. The land i 
Kosovo, exacerbated by a serious overpopulation problem, has been overgrazed and 
overcultivated for centuries. This mismanagement of resources has left most farmers and 
herders practicing subsistence-type agriculture with only small amounts of produce left 
over to sell at market. The mining of coal and other minerals has been an important 
economic factor in Kosovo, but not enough to buoy the weak economy. Coal has always 
been a main export from Kosovo, although even in the best of days the quality of the coal 
(lignite) was low (Country Study, 1992, pp. 164-165). As Yugoslavia became more 
developed, its industries began to run on more modern fuel sources, like oil and natural gas 
and Kosovo's importance as a fuel exporter waned. 
Having an excess of young men, Kosovo, provided many guest workers to Europe 
and the rest of Yugoslavia, i.e. Slovenia and Croatia. When the world economy faltered in 
the 1970s and 1980s numerous Albanian men returned to a Kosovo that had no jobs and 
little hope. As is the universal case, no good can come of numerous unemployed young 
men. 
Helping to fuel the fires of Albanian nationalism was the idea that "if we (Kosovo 
Albanians) had complete control of our government, we would not have these economic 
problems." This line of reasoning cast blame on Serbs and other Yugoslavs even though 
Kosovo, along with other provinces and republics after 1974, was basically responsible for 
its own economy. National ambitions were also fed by broadcasts from neighboring 
Albania that painted an extremely rosy picture of what was happening inside Kosovo's 
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neighbor to the west. Since borders were closed between Yugoslavia and Albania, Kosovo 
Albanians didn't realize that they were socioeconomic giants compared to their cross- 
border cousins. Another factor that aided the "better in Albania" myth was the fact that 
after 1974 Kosovo was allowed to trade with Albania, as long as this was done at very 
moderate levels. During this period, Kosovars were allowed to see the most productive 
side of Albania, which fostered more pan-Albanianism. 
The government of Yugoslavia also made what, in hindsight, has to be considered a 
critical mistake regarding unemployment and the education system in Kosovo. Tito 
decided, in the late 1960s, that if Kosovo was going to have so many unemployed youth 
that it was best to have them attend a university rather than roaming the streets. This was 
also thought to be a good idea because Kosovo lagged behind all other republics in the 
areas of education. Thus, numerous things could be accomplished at once, including a "feel 
good measure" aimed at making up for past injustices. This would be accomplished by 
instruction in the Albanian language and offering a full complement of Albanian cultural 
education. As is normally the case, many well-intended ideas have unintended 
consequences. In 1981 Pristina University had 36,000 full time students and 18,000 part 
time students, three times as many as the university was designed for. Kosovo also had the 
highest percentage of university students of any republic. The nationwide average was 19 
percent; 28 percent of Kosovo's population was enrolled. Almost one in three Kosovars 
were thus receiving some type of university education. Unfortunately, most people were 
working on degrees in the social sciences and humanities, such as literature and history, 
degrees that a province with a third of its population unemployed can ill afford - not to 
mention that these are the degrees that mold nationalists (Vickers, 1998, pp. 194-197). 
Something else worth noting is that this education system was developed quickly from 
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scratch. This meant that many of the educators were under-qualified or just plain 
unqualified. 
Student overcrowding, which was exacerbated by Albanians flocking to Kosovo 
from all the other Yugoslav Republics, caused many problems. It immediately made 
Kosovo the center of Albanian culture. For a people that had been suppressed for years this 
was powerful stuff. It only intensified and furtherer concentrated the Albanian nationalist 
sentiment that had been simmering throughout Kosovo. In 1981, a year after Tito's death, 
student riots rocked Kosovo. Although these riots began as a result of the overcrowded 
conditions at the Pristina University, the underlying tone was the insecurity felt by Kosovar 
Albanians after Tito's death. Many banners expressed the desire for union with Albania or 
that Kosovo be granted full Republic status. In the end, the JNA was called in to quell the 
unexpected chaos, which left hundreds dead (Daalder, 2000, p. 8). It seemed that the 
Yugoslav government, attempting to satisfy an ethnic minority's unemployment problem 
through education, ignited the nationalist fires instead. 
The final consequence of Kosovo's sorry economy was the flight of the Serb 
population. Most Serbs stated, after they left, that the reason for their exodus was pressure 
from the Albanian population. This may be true, but another major reason was the 
economic stagnation in Kosovo. Most of these Serbs who left Kosovo went to live in 
Belgrade. This was the trend for all Serbs throughout Yugoslavia, not just from Kosovo. 
A sizable number of Serbs left Bosnia and Croatia for Belgrade about the same time. A 
number of Croats left Bosnia and went to Zagreb. The tendency seemed to be for Serbs 
and Croats to gravitate to better financial opportunities in their respective ethnic capitals. 
The bottom line is that the economy is at least partially, if not largely, responsible for the 
Serb exodus. 
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It is obvious that Kosovo Albanians suffered under the worst economic conditions 
in Yugoslavia. These conditions bred a sentiment among Albanians that "we can do better 
by ourselves." Combine that feeling with unlimited schooling which preached about the 
greatness of Albanian culture, and it is clear that Yugoslavia created an atmosphere ripe for 
Kosovo's secession. 
C.       POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS 
The case of political inequality in Kosovo is quite well documented. It is a clear- 
cut case of a minority within a specific geographic area feeling unfairly represented. This 
minority strove for greater representation, which it eventually received, only to have the 
rug pulled out from under it. This reduction in autonomy or status is one of the main 
reasons that Kosovo is only nominally a part of Serbia today. In this section I will focus on 
the political situation involving the Kosovo Albanians. 
It is not much of a stretch to say that the Kosovo Albanians were brought into the 
Yugoslav fold kicking and screaming. Their anti-Yugoslav attitudes, combined with 
feelings of untrustworthiness, were crucial factors in the decision not to give Kosovo 
Albanians separate political representation in the early Yugoslavia. This was in contrast to 
the fact that Kosovar Albanians comprised the third largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia, 
behind Serbs and Croats. Macedonia and Montenegro, with approximately half the ethnic 
population of Albanians, both had their own republics while Kosovo remained the 
dominion of Serbia. 
As time went on Tito eventually began to grant more power and autonomy to 
Kosovo. With each change of the constitution Kosovo began to receive more political 
power until 1974, when it, along with Vojvodina, was granted Autonomous Province status 
with nearly the same power as a Republic. At this time Yugoslavia was decentralizing at a 
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rapid pace. Kosovo, along with the other Republics, became responsible for most of its 
own internal management in the areas of education, economy, healthcare, policing, etc. 
With this, Kosovo had now gained more power over its own affairs than, arguably, at any 
time since Ottoman rule. Tito, unknowingly, let the genie out of the bottle, and once out it 
has proved impossible to put back (March, 1999, p. 3). 
After Tito's death, the situation, both politically and economically, began to fall 
apart. Kosovo Albanians regarded Tito as their protector from domination by the Serbs; 
with his death a sense of insecurity quickly grew. This insecurity showed itself first in the 
Pristina Riots in 1981. The Albanians' actions in Pristina took the Serbs off guard and 
eventually, with the rise of Serb nationalism, helped convince the Serbs that Tito had 
granted power to the Kosovar Albanians, and others, at their expense. All these feelings 
came to a head when Slobodan Milosevic arrived on the scene. Between 1989 and 1992 he 
altered the Yugoslav Constitution and suspended Kosovo's autonomous status, stripping 
the region of power. A state of emergency was declared that allowed Serbia to rule Kosovo 
under a "special circumstances" clause (March, 1999, p. 4). 
This action was very popular with Serbs, but in hindsight was a heavy-handed 
mistake. People, whether in a nation or as individuals, always seem to be more willing to 
fight to recover a perceived loss than a to acquire a perceived gain. By taking away 
Kosovo's political status, Milosevic took away the Kosovo Albanians' greatest political 
advance in centuries.   I feel the only reason that war didn't break out at this moment was 
that the Kosovar Albanian population understood it was severely outgunned and would be 
massacred. Another reason rebellion was kept at bay can be attributed to the emergence of 
Ibrahim Rugova and the League for a Democratic Kosovo. 
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As the Serbianization of Kosovo began to take place, Kosovo Albanians began to 
withdraw from anything involving Yugoslavia or Serbia. They refused to take part in any 
Serbian political process and eventually set up a parallel system of government, called the 
Democratic Republic of Kosova. The unofficially elected Ibrahim Rugova led this 
government. The same election that put Rugova in power recorded a 100 percent Kosovar 
Albanian vote for secession from Yugoslavia (Daalder, 2000, p. 8). It is an interesting side 
note that, by boycotting all Yugoslav elections, the Albanians forfeited any representation 
in a legitimate government. This was done to show that the goal was independence, not 
regaining their prior status. This boycott made Kosovo Albanians' claims of undemocratic 
representation ring slightly hollow. The LDK wanted to have their cake and eat it too. 
This parallel government was quite remarkable in the scope and width of services it 
provided. It was funded by a tax on the Albanian population in Kosovo and on Albanians 
in the diaspora. The Albanians then transferred these funds to a bank in Tirana and on to 
Kosovo in an effort to avoid seizure by Serbs. These taxes provided wages to about 25,000 
individuals on the LDK payroll. This money also went to support education, health care, 
labor, and other infrastructure programs in Kosovo. One of the great triumphs of the 
Republic of Kosova was the development of a judicial branch to settle internal Albanian 
disputes that had never been brought before Yugoslav courts, which had always been 
viewed as illegitimate. The first order of business for this judicial branch was to create 
Reconciliation Councils in order to halt blood feuding. The LDK was very successful in 
this area, having reconciled over 1,000 family blood feuds and reportedly resolving over 
23,000 criminal cases. These examples are not just important in the legal sense; they also 
indicate a tremendous amount of unity and ethnic resolve (March, 1999, p. 8-11). 
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The stated goal of the LDK and the Republic of Kosova was the eventual 
independence of Kosova through nonviolent means. This was carried out through 
intifadah-like tactics, such as civil disobedience i.e. labor strikes, protest, boycotts, etc. 
Along with this stated goal came a foreign relations campaign by the LDK. This campaign 
stressed the plight of Kosovar Albanians and their desire for independence. Despite these 
efforts, the LDK was never really taken seriously by the international community and the 
only country to recognize the Republic of Kosova was Albania. 
On the other side of the coin, it is interesting to wonder why Milosevic tolerated 
this Republic of Kosova. He did apply a great amount of pressure on the Kosovar 
Albanians, but the bottom line was that he could have crushed the movement but chose not 
to. Some of the explanations usually given cite the fact that the movement was nonviolent 
and therefore non-threatening to Milosevic. Alternatively, it could be that as long as the 
Kosovar Albanians were engaged in their own system they amounted to a back burner 
problem that would not disrupt the Yugoslav system. Possibly, Milosevic was sensing that 
if enough pressure was put on the Kosovar Albanians a good percentage of them would just 
get fed up and leave Kosovo, which was happening, but at a slow pace. Regardless, in 
hindsight it turns out to have been a mistake to let this parallel government exist. Although 
its leadership espoused patient nonviolence, the parallel government soon gave rise to a 
resistance movement. 
The concept of waiting patiently for the international community to step in and 
grant Kosovo a quick independence gradually wore thin. There appeared to be no 
movement while the situation in Kosovo deteriorated. Money was drying up, healthcare 
was bad, and a generation was receiving inadequate education. The kicker was that, even 
with a considerable amount LDK effort to publicize the plight of Kosovo Albanians, 
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Kosovo was barely paid lip service in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. It thus became 
apparent that as long as there was a quasi-peace in Kosovo the international community 
would do nothing and hope the status quo would simply continue. This feeling was echoed 
when the leader of Albania, under pressure from the international community, stated that he 
hoped a solution to the Kosovo problem would be achieved within a Yugoslav context 
(Vickers, 1998, pp. 282-286). Kosovar Albanians felt hopeless and humiliated after seeing 
their fellow Yugoslavs gain international attention and independence through violence. No 
wonder Kosovo Albanians soon abandoned Rugova and put their faith in a new group of 
men with a new strategy revolving around active rebellion. 
In conclusion, the political inequality precondition is definitely present in the 
Kosovo case. I think that what makes the political aspect even more powerful is the loss 
factor. A significant minority was granted a great deal of power over its own affairs and 
then, suddenly, these powers were illegally revoked. A minority may or may not fight to 
gain more power; however, if the minority feels it is losing power the chances of conflict 
increase significantly. 
D.        RISE OF POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 
In my opinion, political entrepreneurs played a smaller role in the Kosovo case than 
in Bosnia. It is also my belief that there was more entrepreneurship on the side of the Serbs 
than on the side of the Kosovar Albanians. The Kosovar leadership failed to peacefully 
deliver the goods and was overtaken by a more radical mass. In both instances the 
leadership had maximalist goals with no room for compromise, a sure recipe for conflict. 
On the Serb side, entrepreneurship came in the form of Slobodan Milosevic. His 
hard-line stance with the Kosovar Albanians sounded the death knell for Yugoslavia. The 
reason I consider his stance in Kosovo entrepreneurship is because, although there were 
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real ethnic, social, political, and economic problems in Kosovo, he chose to take action that 
would inflame the situation rather than calm it. This made him very popular with Serbs, but 
laid the groundwork for future problems. Milosevic's actions in Kosovo were not as 
popular with the Serb leadership as they were with the Serb population. Ivan Stambolic, 
the former president of the Serb Republic and the man who brought Milosevic in under his 
wing, did not agree with these hard-line maneuvers. Stambolic, believing that a hard-line 
policy in Kosovo would lead to trouble, publicly voiced his opposition and was eventually 
purged from the party by his former comrade, Milosevic (Vickers, 1998, pp. 227-229). 
It should be noted that Milosevic's stance on Kosovo was not even close to being 
extreme. Individuals who ran against Milosevic for the Serb presidency held much stronger 
views regarding the protection of Kosovo Serbs and Serbs in other areas of Yugoslavia. 
One of Milosevic's competitors, Vojslav Seselj, was the leader of the Serb Radical Party 
and a very popular Serb politician. From the beginning, his party's stance was that all 
Albanians should be forcibly expelled from Kosovo. Milosevic clearly felt pressure from 
these more radical groups to tighten the screws on the Albanians, a "keep up with the 
Jones" effect. 
It also seems to me that Milosevic personally disliked Albanians. Warren 
Zimmerman, the last American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, singled out three traits about 
Milosevic. The first one was that he strongly disliked Albanians (Zimmerman, 1999, p. 26). 
This is powerful because Milosevic made war on three other ethnic groups in the former 
Yugoslavia. Yet, according to Zimmerman, he really disliked Albanians. I believe 
Milosevic approached much of his policy on Kosovo from his gut. 
On the other side we find Ibrahim Rugova, a poet by trade, whose father was 
executed by the Yugoslav government in 1945 as an enemy of the state. Rugova came to 
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power in his party, the League for a Democratic Kosovo, under the banner of nonviolence 
with the eventual goal of international recognition for an independent Kosova. After 
Rugova took power he ran a campaign to stifle all other Albanian political parties in 
Kosovo. He felt that the LDK was the only legitimate representative of Kosovar 
Albanians. Despite this slightly undemocratic system, Rugova was a favorite of 
international politicians, being hosted by the likes of President Clinton and Lord Owen. As 
Rugova found out, this congeniality with international leaders did not translate into 
favorable changes for Kosovar Albanians. International leaders never cozied up to the idea 
of an independent Kosovo and always attempted to fix the crisis within the context of 
Serbia and Yugoslavia. 
I would classify Ibrahim Rugova a political entrepreneur, but of the less dangerous 
sort. He did not seek violence, but his policies are certainly to blame for much of the 
bloodshed in Kosovo. By setting the bar high i.e. only independence for Kosovo, he fed 
his supporters (the majority of Kosovar Albanians) an unrealistic expectation that such a 
state could gain international recognition. He gave Kosovar Albanians the impression that 
they would peacefully gain their independence within a few years of the Serb crackdown. 
When it became obvious that Rugova's policies were ringing hollow, the Kosovar 
Albanians abandoned him in favor of a more violent wing. The international community 
bears some blame in this story also. The international community verbally supported this 
man's nonviolent approach, but in actions only rewarded violence. Through neglect in the 
Dayton Accords, the international community essentially assured a military solution to the 
Kosovo problem. 
The international community made it clear to the Kosovar Albanians that, due to 
Rugova's stipulation regarding the alteration of existing territorial boundaries, their 
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aspirations of independence could not be achieved. The Kosovar Albanians cried foul 
about this because, at Dayton, the Bosnian Serbs had been granted separate Republic status 
within Bosnia, with the possible later option of confederation with Serbia. For the majority 
of Kosovar Albanians, the writing was on the wall: violence is the only way to secure the 
goal of independence. 
It should also be remembered that at this time the majority of young Kosovar 
Albanians could not speak Serbian and viewed Belgrade as an occupying power. Due to 
the Kosovar Albanians' high birth rate, youth constituted a substantial portion of the 
population, a portion that was not only predisposed but could effect a more radical 
approach. 
After the Dayton Accords, rival political parties began to emerge that discredited 
the LDK and pushed for a violent solution. Killings of Serb policemen and civilians began 
to escalate. From 1996 these actions began to take the form of multiple coordinated 
attacks, demonstrating a fairly high level of sophistication. The shadowy Kosovo 
Liberation Army emerged to claim credit for these attacks. The KLA also began a ruthless 
policy of killing suspected collaborators. After these killings the, KLA would issue 
threatening statements urging Albanians to "stay the line" against Serbs. 
A sure sign that the secretive KLA was taking control was the 1997 funeral for an 
Albanian schoolteacher killed by Serb Security Forces. Three masked KLA gunmen gave 
a speech to the cheers of 20,000 attendees. The speech referred to the fact that violence 
was the only way to achieve Kosovar Albania's goals (Vickers, 1998, p. 313). 
I don't believe the KLA or its political wing fits in the political entrepreneur 
category. The KLA was a loosely affiliated, grass roots organization that barely had any 
central command. This is apparent in the organization's continuous infighting and the lack 
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of coordination between regions. The KLA was organized around family, clans, and 
regional affiliations. Its popularity cannot be denied. Its ranks swelled so quickly that it 
had to turn away many prospective recruits. If there ever was an organization that sprang 
from the masses, the KLA was it. 
Thus, although entrepreneurship played its role in Kosovo, I feel politicians did 
what the constituents wanted. Milosevic rose to power, backed by the Serb populace that 
loved his get-tough policy on Kosovo. Rugova came to power because his goal was 
independence from Serbia. When Rugova couldn't deliver on his promise the Kosovar 
Albanian people backed the men who they felt could deliver, the KLA. 
E.        MASS HOSTILITY 
In the case of Kosovo, considerable mass hate already existed before the crisis in 
the late 1980s. In reality there was never much love lost between Serbs and Kosovar 
Albanians. Preconditions were slowly building towards a violent confrontation that would 
have been hard to avert. Some of the same things that we saw in Bosnia we can see in 
Kosovo: propaganda, paramilitary gangs etc. However, the difference is that in Bosnia 
many of the events were manufactured or hyped. In Kosovo, both ethnicities had a more 
legitimate reason to fear for their safety, culture, and general way of life. Kosovo would 
have gone up in flames eventually. The reason that violence intensified when it did has a 
lot to do with the Mass Hate factor. Certain events made mass hate more contagious: the 
general insecurity caused by war, an influx of refugees, and the collapse of neighboring 
Albania. 
I believe that mass hate existed for a long time among a certain percentage of 
Kosovar Albanians. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s there were numerous incidents of 
rape and violence directed against Serbs in an attempt to force them to leave Kosovo. It 
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seems that these efforts were not organized from the top, but occurred at the grass roots in 
order to gain an ethically pure Albania (Vickers, 1998, p. 220). This contrasts sharply with 
the current situation, in which a coordinated effort is being made from the top by Kosovar 
leaders to expel Serbs. It should be remembered that the maximalist aims of the parallel 
government, which had 100 percent of the populace's support for secession, was not for 
autonomy and not for Republic status. 
The Kosovar Albanians were initially willing to out wait the Serbs for two reasons. 
The first reason had to do with the emergence of Ibrahim Rugova who promised the 
eventual recognition of an independent Kosovo through peaceful means. The second was 
the lack of arms; even individuals who are ready to fight need arms, especially against an 
efficient military force like the JNA. Both of these issues were overcome between 1995 
and 1997. 
In 1995 Rugova was discredited when the international community refused to 
clarify the Kosovo issue during the Dayton Accords. Hatred built as the Kosovars waited 
in vain for recognition, while Serb repression only grew. The population changes within 
the Kosovar Albanian society were also significant. The children, growing into adulthood 
at this time, spoke no Serbian and had been brought up feeling that Serbs were oppressive 
foreign occupiers. 
As for weapons, the KLA received an absolute windfall as the neighboring 
government of Albania collapsed. Albania's armories were laid wide open and the border, 
at least on the Albanian side, suddenly proved more porous. There was an immediate 
influx of new weapons and equipment from Albania. This influx did not completely 
alleviate the KLA's weapons shortage, but carried it a long way from where it previously 
stood (Kosovo: Background to Crisis, 1999, pp. 6-9). Also just the fact that the KLA was 
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able to evolve in a very short time from a small terrorist organization to a guerrilla force 
controlling up to 50 percent of Kosovo demonstrates the people's willingness for an armed 
solution. 
On the Serb side, there was also a lot of residual hate, almost to the point of hysteria 
(Sudetic, 1998, p. 80). There was, of course, government propaganda, but when 80 of the 
top Serb intellectuals petitioned to stop the genocide against Serbs in Kosovo, things rose 
to a new level. This wasn't hate as practiced by ignorant peasants; this was hate that was a 
reinforcing theme, which cut across and through all levels of Serb society. When, for 
instance, Warren Zimmerman recounts, that he asked a sophisticated female artist at a 
dinner party, how she would deal with the Kosovo problem and she responds "Simple, just 
line all the Albanians up against a wall and shoot them" (Zimmerman, 1999, p. 17), one 
can't help but recognize that hate was there. 
One of the things that transformed this hate into violence was the instability 
fomented by surrounding wars. As Serbia began to lose historically Serb territory in the 
Krajina and Bosnia, refugees began to filter into other Serb-held lands. This created an 
opportunity for the Kosovo re-colonization program. The refugees tended to be radicalized 
and had little respect for any long-term local relationships between Kosovo Serbs and 
Albanians. Kosovar Albanians clearly reinforced this, as they displayed some restraint 
toward long-term Serb residents of Kosovo. However, newly arriving Serb refugees were 
immediate targets. Another brand of new arrivals, meanwhile were ex-soldiers of the Serb 
campaign in the Bihac pocket. Many of these soldiers, some wanted by The Hague as war 
criminals, had been paid handsomely for their service. Along with them came members of 
Arkan's and Seselj's paramilitaries who recruited and formed affiliated units in the area. 
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Coupled with a campaign by Belgrade to arm all Serbs in Kosovo, this only further fed 
local mistrust. 
The mutual dislike and hatred between Serb and Albanian, more than between any 
other Yugoslav ethnicities, was not something that anyone had to create. It has been there 
for centuries. Yugoslav leaders had successfully managed to keep the lid on the pot. All 
these measures created an even more tenuous atmosphere in Kosovo which in 1998 led to 
the quick spiral into violence. With the lid taken off, the heat turned up, and other 
ingredients boiling, violence was bound to spiral out of hand, which it did in 1998. 
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IV.      THE TURKISH/KURDISH ISSUE IN SOUTHEAST TURKEY 
A.       HISTORY OF ETHNIC TENSION 
The Turkish/Kurdish problem is of a more recent origin than that between Kosovo 
Albanians and Serbs. The tension does not go back centuries. The actual rift started only in 
the 1920's. Yet the violence and hatred are as real as in any other ethnic crisis. The Kurds 
and Turks are also, generally, of the same religion and held nearly equal status in the 
Ottoman Empire. Because of these similarities it is illuminating to chart their course from 
partners to hated enemies. 
1.        Fear of Domination 
The fear of domination by one side over the other is historically very young. Since 
both Turks and Kurds are predominantly Muslim, both faired relatively well in the 
Ottoman Empire. This is one of the underlying contradictions in the whole 
Turkish/Kurdish dispute. In the Ottoman Empire only groups who were not Muslim could 
attain minority status, like the Serbs or Greeks. This attitude paved the way for non-Turkish 
Muslim cultures to be marginalized in modern secular Turkey. 
The fear of domination came into play for the Kurds directly after the formation of 
modem Turkey in 1923. The Kurds were instrumental in helping the new Turkish republic 
rise from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. They assisted the founder of modem Turkey, 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in both defeating the Armenians and the Greeks. The Kurds were 
strung along and led to believe they were fighting to expel and repel the Christian menace 
and rebuild an Islamic nation where they would be the equals of the Turks, just as in the 
Ottoman days. 
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As time went on, however it became apparent that Ataturk was a staunch advocate 
of secularism and very much a Turkish nationalist. Ataturk was so much a Turkish 
nationalist that he refused to identify any minorities in Turkey, claiming that all citizens of 
Turkey were Turkish. His successor, Ismet Inonu, summarized the feeling in 1925, "We 
must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and we will annihilate those who 
oppose the Turks." (Barkey, 1998, p. 10) 
This did not sit well with certain Kurds, especially in the Southeast of the country 
where the majority of the Kurdish population was located. Resentment about Turkish 
domination immediately sparked the Sheik Said Rebellion in 1925; this rebellion sought a 
reinstatement of the Caliph and a separate Kurdish state in the southeast. The rebellion was 
put down, but a series of other separate Kurdish rebellions, each of which was defeated, 
continuously sprang up until 1940. 
The Turkish state responded to these rebellions in a very heavy-handed fashion. It 
did not give an inch and instead began to institute a policy of cultural extinction through 
assimilation. In 1925 the Southeast became a Military District under control of the Army. 
This situation did not change until 1965. Also, at this time all Kurdish language schools, 
organizations, and publications were banned (Gunter, 1997, p. 5). The speaking of the 
Kurdish language was eventually deemed a terrorist act, its use punishable by 
imprisonment. But perhaps the most effective method implemented by the Turkish state in 
combating the Kurdish nationalism is and was the far-reaching policy of forced migration 
and assimilation. 
Turkey does not tolerate anyone who claims to be or acts as anything other than 
Turkish. Unlike other ethnicities (i.e. Serbs or Albanians), being a Turk, at least if one is 
Kurdish, is as easy as claiming to be a Turk. And, it seems, that there is very little stigma 
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attached to Kurds who disavow their Kurdish ancestry. There are slight physical 
distinctions between Kurds and Turks, but nothing that is a dead giveaway. All avenues 
and opportunities are open to Kurds who embrace the Turkish "ethnicity", including 
business and politics. Therefore, to the Turks, assimilation is as good as eviction or 
extermination. 
Beginning in the 1920s the goal of the assimilation program was to forcibly move 
Kurds from the Southeast to the urban areas of the west. The end state was to have the 
Kurdish population represent less then five percent in any area. Kurdish children were also 
taken from their families and raised as Turks. This was a very effective campaign but did 
not work completely due to the sheer size of the Kurdish population. It is estimated that 
Kurds make up from 12 to 20 percent of the population of Turkey; in the last seven years 
2,000,000 have been forcibly displaced (Barkey, 1998, pp. 62-63). 
Also, along these lines of assimilation came the trend of portraying the Kurdish 
culture as having Turkish roots. The Kurdish language, it is claimed, has only 800 words 
and is therefore inferior to Turkish. This was taken to the point where the word 'Kurd' was 
itself claimed to be a corruption of the sound made underfoot when snow crunches; hence 
Kurds should be called Mountain Turks. All effort was made to consciously and 
subconsciously ethnically unify Turkey. 
Much as with the United States government's assimilation program towards the 
American Indians, the Turkish program to assimilate Kurds was not without effect. There 
are many Turkish citizens of Kurdish origins who are completely happy to live their lives 
as Turks, some in extremely high political positions. At the same time the success of this 
perceived cultural extinction scares other Turkish Kurds. 
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The Turkish fear of domination can be traced back to the founding of the Republic 
and the ideology of Kemal Ataturk. In the early 1920s there were several major efforts to 
carve territory out of the area that was then the Ottoman Empire, on the verge of becoming 
modern Turkey. In 1922 the Greeks thought the Empire was weak and made a failed 
attempt to grab the portion of western Turkey that contained a large Greek population. The 
Armenians also tried to carve a home out of portions of northeast Turkey, but were also 
defeated. In 1923, out of chaos, Ataturk founded the new Turkish state. 
At the end of these wars, with their massive population exchanges and 
exterminations, the Kurds wound up the largest minority in Turkey making up anywhere 
from 12 to 25 percent of the population. Drawing further attention to this potential threat 
was the 1920 Treaty of Sevres, which carved up the Ottoman Empire, granted the 
Armenians statehood, and promised the Kurds autonomy with the option of a nation in the 
future.   After Ataturk formed the Republic he reneged on the treaty, but the wars and the 
treaty instilled within the Turkish psyche a great fear of being dismembered like its 
predecessor, the Ottoman Empire. 
Kemal Ataturk and his successors have viewed Kurdish nationalism in Southeast 
Turkey as a direct security threat to the state. Kemal founded the nation on secularism and 
Turkish nationalism; the mere mention that other ethnicities existed could land a person in 
prison. Given these historical conditions and Turkey's neighbors - Syria, Iraq, Iran, 
Armenia, and Greece, none of which can be said to be extremely friendly - Turkish fears 
could be warranted. Most of Turkey's neighbors at one time or another have supported the 
current Kurdish nationalist movement and possess historical grievances against Turkey 
over territory, water rights, etc. Essentially, modern Turkey has evolved in a state of 
paranoia. Any concession to the Kurds, including the admission of their mere existence, is 
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believed to lead to greater concessions and eventual secession. To quote the Turkish Vice 
Chief of Staff on recognizing the Kurdish language and education, these are, "salami 
tactics, the more slices we cut the more they will take" (Gunter, 1997, p. 11). 
Another factor in the Turkish view of the Kurdish nationalist threat has to do with 
the military's role in the government. The Turkish military is considered the protector of 
the state and the most strident supporter of the Kemalist ideology. The Turkish military 
has reserved the right to seize power when even the state has veered away from Ataturk's 
vision. This seizure of power has happened three times since the nation's inception, with 
coups in 1960,1971, and 1980. Following each coup, a military crackdown ensued, aimed 
at not only Kurds, but also leftists, rightists, Muslim fundamentalists, or anyone else 
deemed a threat to the state. This military control has led to a feeling that the only solution 
to Kurdish nationalism is through military force. To quote chief of staff of the Turkish 
armed forces, General Dogan Gures, "there is no Kurdish problem in Turkey.. .There is a 
problem of assault on the Turkish Republic"(Gunter, 1997, p. 74). 
2.        Threatening Symbols 
Both sides possess threatening symbols but they differ in degree and in kind. The 
Kurds deploy language and cultural symbols. The Turks have a much more threatening 
military and police force operating in the Southeast. 
The first symbol of Kurdish nationalism has to be the language. As is true in the 
case of the Kosovars, language is the tie that binds Turkish Kurds. Although Turks have 
claimed that the Kurdish language is nothing but a corrupted version of Turkish, it is, in 
reality, very different from either Turkish or Arabic (Barkey, 1998, p. 60). There have 
been efforts to eradicate the language and make its use criminal, but to this day there are 
many people in the Southeast who speak only Kurdish. It should also be recognized that 
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although the Kurdish language is a great unifier it was never a language used by the 
Ottomans for administrative purposes and therefore never achieved a written form until 
after the dissolution of the empire. Its suppression in Turkey did not help its evolution. 
Another threatening symbol would have to be the colors red, yellow, and green. 
These colors appear together on the flags and crests of various Kurdish nationalist 
movements throughout Europe and the Middle East. It is interesting that in the 1980s and 
1990s the Turkish government tried to change stoplight colors from red, yellow, and green 
to red, yellow, and blue in an attempt to break up the nationalist colors. Another example of 
this flag's power was demonstrated to me in 1996 during Operation Provide Comfort in 
Northern Iraq. The forces involved were composed of Americans, French, Brits, and 
Turks. Since most of the local Security Forces were Kurdish, the American commander 
also let the Kurds fly their flag. This outraged the Turks, who lodged a formal complaint 
with their government and eventually we had to take the flag down. 
The final symbol the Turks consider threatening is the traditional dress of the 
Kurds. Kemalist ideology prides itself on modernity. To Turks, traditional Kurdish dress 
is threatening not only because it seems to flaunt Kurdish nationalism, but also because it 
represents a certain primitiveness that modern Turkey has spent decades attempting to 
distance itself from. The traditional clothing that Kurds wear in Iraq is prohibited in 
Turkey in favor of a more western type appearance, such as coat and tie. It is almost 
impossible to find a Kurd in Turkey wearing baggy pants, the sash, and the turban. 
To Kurds, the Turkish security regime is the number one threat in both real and 
symbolic terms. There are layers upon layers of Turkish Security Forces in the Southeast. 
The Southeast has been the domain of the military off and on since the Republic's 
inception. Not only has the Army been involved but also the Turkish Intelligence (MIT), 
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the Gendarmerie, and groups called Special Teams and Special Units. The last three of 
these units have been involved in the torture and suspicious deaths of opposition 
politicians, human rights advocates, journalists, and Kurdish nationalists. I found being in 
Southeast Turkey akin to living in a police state; population control measures were stifling. 
Turkish forces were omnipresent and basically adopted a shoot first and ask questions later 
policy. 
The symbol of these security forces is the Turkish flag with its red crescent. As 
mentioned earlier, flags in Turkey are extremely important. The symbol of the Turkish 
equivalent of the Red Cross is the organization called the Red Crescent. This organization 
and the symbol are threatening because the Red Crescent is considered by Kurds to be a 
front for the Turkish Intelligence. 
The other set of symbols which threatens Kurds is what the Turkish Forces leave 
behind after conducting village "evacuations". Evacuation is a euphemism for the 
destruction of a Kurdish village and the deportation of its inhabitants to the west. This is 
done in an effort to deprive the Kurdish Workers Union (PKK) or other nationalist 
elements of support. Depopulation of Kurdish villages has been going on since 1925 and 
empty devastated villages themselves serve as threatening symbols. Also the very threat of 
"evacuation" is often used on village elders in order to get their villages to cooperate with 
Turkish forces, either by providing Kurdish village guards or by not supporting other 
Kurdish nationalist forces.   It is extremely powerful to see a village that has existed for 
centuries disappear; the remains serve as a warning to those who refuse to cooperate. In 
1995 the US State Department's human rights report ranked only Iran, Iraq, North Korea, 
Burma, and Cuba as bigger human rights violators than Turkey (Gunter, 1997, p. 13). 
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3.        Negative Stereotypes 
Kurds view Turks as obvious ethnophiles who make no room for other ethnicities. 
Linked to this idea is the belief that Turks hold a very high view of themselves and their 
culture. I personally recall an event in Bosnia while walking through an ancient castle with 
my Bosnian interpreter. The interpreter had just explained to me the history of the castle 
and which ancient Bosnian king had built the structure. At that very moment a Turkish 
officer struck up a conversation with us, commenting on how ancient Turks had built this 
castle. This anecdote is related to the stereotype that the Turks play fast and lose with 
historical fact and cannot be trusted. Kurds believe Ataturk misled them during the 
formation of the Republic. This has led to a credibility gap. 
Turks consider Kurds primitive. The Kurdish economy was based on herding, and 
the entire society revolved around this way of life. Kurds occupy the fringe of nations to 
which they belong. Their education level is generally not as high as that of Turks and their 
language is not as evolved as is Turkish. Turkish authors reinforce this view by writing 
books that claim Kurds are actually Turks, and that the Kurdish language is a subset of the 
Turkish language. Blood feuding and inter-village warfare are the norm. The Southeast is a 
poverty-stricken economic backwater that is 180 degrees different from the West. 
Turks also view Kurds as secessionist and thus consider them a security threat to 
the state. This is reinforced by news reports disseminated to Turkish citizens that blame 
most of the problems in the Southeast on the Kurds and Kurdish nationalists. 
In my dealings with Turkish officers in Turkey and Northern Iraqi I was told more 
than once in response to my providing information gleaned from Kurdish soldiers that "all 
Kurds lie and cannot be trusted." 
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B.        ECONOMIC PRECONDITIONS 
Southeast Turkey is the economic backwater of the Republic. It has the highest 
unemployment rates and lowest per capita incomes. In 1992 the average GNP for Turkey 
was $2032, in the Southeastern provinces it was $300 (Barkey, 1998, p. 188). There are 
several reasons for this, including the economic history of the region, geography, and war. 
This poor economic condition has directly led to the increase in ethnic violence. 
One of the reasons the Southeast is less wealthy when compared to the remainder of 
the country is that currently about half of the population is involved in animal husbandry 
and much of the remaining portion is involved in agriculture. This is historically the way 
that Kurdish people have sustained themselves, but it is not the path towards economic 
equality with an industrialized West. 
Investment in the Southeast by Turkish business interests has never been looked 
upon very favorably. Even if the area were not embroiled in ethnic turmoil its mere 
location does not lend itself to trade. The Southeast is mountainous and landlocked, the 
transportation network is poor, and currently the Middle Eastern markets are not open to 
Turkish trade. The reasoning goes: why would a person invest in an area that is in constant 
turmoil when you can easily manage a safer and more reliable return on your money by 
investing in the West with its Mediterranean ports and European markets. 
The Turkish government has, over the years, attempted to economically invigorate 
the Southeast though a series of economic initiatives, but many of these seem half-hearted 
attempts at best. Sometimes the completed factory stands empty, sometimes partially built, 
and sometimes these plans are just never acted upon. It has been speculated by Kurds that 
it is the Turkish government's policy to keep the area economically weak in order to 
encourage Kurds to emigrate from the area and thereby assimilate them. 
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Another problem with the economy in the Southeast is that land is 
disproportionately concentrated in the hands of a small number of people. Turkey went 
though a phase of land reform in the early 1940s, but for political reasons the Southeast 
remained untouched. In order to secure the votes of the Kurdish landowners - the aghas - 
a status quo agreement was reached. This feudal type system has only hurt the Kurdish 
nationalist movement and divided the Kurds themselves along class lines and loyalties to 
the Turkish government (Barkey, 1998, pp. 187-191). 
Such economic disparity, which can actually still be found throughout the Republic, 
directly spawned a large Turkish leftist movement in the 1960s. Much of the Kurdish 
nationalist movement fell in alongside this leftist movement hoping for an alliance. When 
it appeared the leftists were not representing the Kurdish interests in a vocal enough 
manner the Kurdish Worker's Party emerged. This organization not only wanted an 
independent Kurdish state, but was also based upon a strict Marxist ideology preaching 
land reform and economic equality. 
When guerrilla warfare increased in the late 1980s, the Southeast's economy only 
suffered further. The PKK and government forces killed or took hostage much of the 
livestock that Kurds depend upon. Business investment became even less likely than it 
already was and the war amounted to an even greater drain on the overall Turkish 
economy. Comparing my 1995 stay in Southeast Turkey to my 1996 stay in Bosnia I 
thought there was more government neglect of infrastructure, more poverty, and more 
destruction from warfare in Southeast Turkey than in Bosnia. The difference between the 
Southeast area and Istanbul was even starker; going from Istanbul to the Southeast was like 
visiting a different planet. 
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Surprisingly, the biggest advocates of a peaceful solution to Kurdish ethnic 
problems in Turkey are members of Turkey's business community. They are paying the 
bill for the huge cost of maintaining a military presence in the Southeast and have become 
the most liberal spokesmen for finding a political rather than a military solution to the 
Kurdish problem in Turkey. 
There is much danger in maintaining the economic status quo in the Southeast. As 
the economically displaced Kurds flood the cities of the West with few job skills and little 
education the situation can only become increasingly unstable. Although things seem calm 
now, it is easy to envision the Turkish government inadvertently exporting a Kurdish 
rebellion to all corners of the Republic. 
C.        POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS 
Political inequality is an understatement for Kurds in Turkey. Inequality is taken to 
a new level when the state that you belong to refuses to acknowledge that your ethnicity 
even exists. This is the case in modern Turkey with reference to the Kurds. For a long 
time, their existence was not recognized politically or even spoken about in political 
circles. The Kurds had no party that represented their interests, even in a minority fashion. 
This lack of representation is where political problems began. 
In the beginning, and until very recently, the Turkish Republic's policy was that all 
Kurds were basically "Mountain Turks". They had no special status or representation and 
were expected to melt into the Turkish population. Therefore, there was no representation 
of them in government nor was there even any debate about their existence. Talk about the 
Kurdish issue in political and private circles was taboo. The official government policy, 
which has been engrained in the populace's mind, was that anyone who claimed to be a 
Kurd was a separatist and an enemy of the state. 
69 
The spirit of Kemal Ataturk, who invented modern Turkish politics, lives on. The 
conviction that Turkey is a unitary state with a uniform national identity, is, and has been, 
alive and well in Turkish politics and especially in the Turkish military. After each of three 
coups there has been a crackdown on any perceived Kurdish political identity. This has 
been done through the banning of political parties, arrests of key individuals, and the 
implementation of emergency rule in the Southeast. The military has not only stifled 
Kurds, but also any other perceived threats to Kemalism, whether posed by leftists or 
Muslim fundamentalists. The knowledge that the military will not hesitate to step in has 
stifled intelligent political thought and has led to a very unimaginative approach to Kurdish 
issues. 
After the 1980 coup and military takeover of the government, which lasted until 
1983, the implementation of the new constitution laid the groundwork for a government 
that revolved around the Prime Minister, the President, the National Security Council, and 
the Turkish General Staff. The office responsible for initiating change has been the Prime 
Minister's, while the Presidency became the office containing this change. The National 
Security Council is the most influential body in Turkish policy making. This body is a 
civil-military institution created in the aftermath of the 1960 coup. The NSC is presided 
over by the President and includes the Prime Minister, Secretary of Defense, and heads of 
all services including the Gendarmerie, ministers of defense, interior, and foreign affairs. 
This is an advisory board, but given its composition is the most powerful body in Turkey 
(Barkey, 1998, p. 143). 
In these government bodies it has never been considered possible to debate or 
discuss Kurdish issues until the mid 1990s. The situation eased up then with president 
Ozal's declaration in the late 1980s that he recognized the Kurdish reality (i.e. Kurds are a 
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minority that do exist in Turkey). This statement seems rather obvious to casual outside 
observers, but to Turks it was extremely controversial. Another point about this statement 
is that it was not made as a consequence of political bargaining but thanks to fighting in the 
Southeast. The Turkish government was only willing to make this concession in hopes that 
it would appease the PKK and Kurdish nationalists. 
1990 was the first year that a political party claiming to represent Kurdish interests 
entered the scene. The HEP (Labor party), which evolved into the DEP (Democratic party) 
was based on a platform which sought the abolition of emergency rule in the Southeast and 
freedom of use of the Kurdish language in schools, print, and broadcast. In 1991, the HEP, 
representing the Southeast, won 22 seats in parliament. During the parliamentary swearing 
in ceremony the new representatives chose to wear traditional Kurdish colors and speak 
Kurdish while taking the oath. They were subsequently arrested. This scene has played 
itself out with party members being arrested and Kurdish parties being banned several 
times. The government has also accused these parties of collaborating with the PKK. As a 
result, since 1990 there have been 92 murders of members of these parties; no one has been 
brought to trial (Barkey, 1998, pp. 84-89). 
Political representation for Kurds has led to improvements over the years with the 
declaration that Kurds exist and the increased political activities of Kurdish political 
parties. However, tension still exists. There continues to be a feeling on one side that it has 
given too much while the other side feels as though it barely got anything. 
D.        RISE OF POLITICAL ENTREPRENEURS 
Political entrepreneurship, in distinctive flavors, was and is alive and well in 
the Turkish/Kurdish case. This region boasts a long history of political strong men dating 
back centuries. On the Turkish side, entrepreneurship has come in the form of a single- 
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minded, unbending approach to dealing with Kurdish nationalism. In my opinion, on the 
other side there is a culture that falls easy prey to personality worship, and these 
personalities have at times hijacked the Kurdish nationalist movement for limited gains. 
Modern Turkey's seminal political entrepreneur has to be considered Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk. His original name was just Mustafa Kemal; the name Ataturk was given 
later - the translation is "Chief of the Turks". And his spirit certainly lives on in today's 
Turkey. His busts are everywhere; his likeness is held in enormous regard. US soldiers are 
warned not to laugh in his statue's presence for this is a crime. For his time Kemal was a 
great reformer. His vision and efforts to modernize Turkey were monumental. However, 
in his ideology of "one Turkey, one people" lies the foundation for the Republic's ethnic 
problems. Where the leadership of Turkey has erred is in not changing certain aspects of 
Kemalist ideology to adapt to the times, especially since Ataturk's ideology condones 
intolerance and the oppression of all non-Turkish ethnicities. 
The organization that has carried the banner of Kemalist ideology through the 
Republic is the Turkish military. As an American, I found it fascinating to work with the 
Turkish military and had the good fortune to speak with many Turkish military officers 
about a number of subjects. On many occasions I can remember the high regard with 
which they spoke of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. During any discussions about Turkey or the 
Kurdish issue he and his ideology were always brought up at the outset of every 
conversation. It would be similar to a US officer continually quoting or referring back to 
George Washington. 
This intense guardianship of the Republic has led the military to intervene in 
government affairs, either through policy or directly via coup. One can argue that this 
strongman looking over the shoulder of Turkish politics has slightly retarded the natural 
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progression of the Kurdish issue. Turkish politicians, gun-shy of the Kurdish subject, 
never forced the issue. In the end, because the politicians have not wanted to handle the 
Kurdish issue, the Turkish Military has become almost the sole proprietor of the Southeast. 
Obviously, this creates a square peg/round hole problem. The military, when given 
complete control, will go to the extreme and seek a military solution. In the long run, this 
will not solve the problems associated with Kurdish nationalism. 
In recent years there have been changes brought about by some Turkish politicians. 
President Ozal, who took power in 1984, came in with a hard-line stance on the Kurdish 
problem, but eventually became the man who recognized that there was a Kurdish reality. 
He led the way on innovation and reform in the Southeast, with such things as the 1993 
ceasefire with the PKK and subsequent talks. Many times these initiatives were met with 
the disapproval and scorn of his colleagues. After his unexpected death later in 1993 things 
went back to business as usual with many of his policies either overturned or neglected. 
On the other side of the court, the Kurds, especially Turkish Kurds, have been 
latecomers to the arena of nationalism. Geographic remoteness, and linguistic and cultural 
differences can explain this slow self-recognition. These factors, combined with the 
suppression of the Turkish Kurds by the Republic, have made it very difficult for the 
development of a sense of Kurdish nationalism. Another factor that comes into play with 
Kurds is the idea of political entrepreneurship in the form of clan leaders. One of the main 
problems of Kurdish nationalism is a lack of unity; much of this lack of unity is a direct 
result of infighting among Kurdish leaders. Much of this fighting is orchestrated by outside 
powers, but a lot of it is the result of Kurdish leaders wanting to hang on to what they have 
at the expense of other Kurdish clans. This shortsightedness is the result of self-interested 
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entrepreneurship. One clan leader who attempted to change the paradigm and must be 
considered the inspiration behind modern Kurdish nationalism is Mullah Mustafa Barzani. 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani was not a Turkish Kurd, although he was bora near the 
Turkish border with Iraq. He became a leader of the Kurds in Northern Iraq and in the 
early 1970s began to wage war for autonomy against the government of Iraq. His 
campaigns are legendary; as a Kurdish warrior or peshmerga he has no equal. He was very 
successful, and the Iraqi government eventually had to yield to his demands. Barzani 
united the Kurds in Northern Iraq and temporarily gained autonomous status for the 
Kurdish region of Northern Iraq. This was the greatest achievement for Kurds in a century. 
Although the Turkish government tried to downplay Barzani's accomplishments, these 
events in Iraq did not go unnoticed by Kurds living across the border in Turkey. The 
victory gave birth to the possibility of gaining similar recognition and autonomy in Turkey. 
The Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), currently controlling more than half of Northern 
Iraq, is Barzani's creation. In the 1970s, an underground political party, mirroring 
Barzani's organization in Iraq, sprang up in Turkey. To this day all Kurds revere his name. 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani is arguably the most influential Kurd of our times. 
A man who was strongly influenced by Barzani's feats in Northern Iraq is the 
currently incarcerated Abdullah Ocalan. Ocalan was born in Southeast Turkey and came of 
age during Barzani's successes. Although influenced by Barzani, Ocalan chose a different 
path for his brand of Kurdish nationalism. Kurdish culture is traditionally very 
hierarchical. Ocalan chose to go against the grain of this by founding his organization, the 
Kurdish Worker's Party, on Marxism. His leftist leanings immediately alienated many 
Kurds, especially clannish followers of Barzani. Once Ocalan had established the PKK and 
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gained a following in the late 1970s he and his organization narrowly escaped to Syria after 
the 1980 military takeover in Turkey. 
In Syria, Ocalan determined that the time for action had come. He felt the takeover 
by the Turkish military was too much for Turkey's Kurdish population to bear. He worked 
out an agreement with the Syrian government which provided the PKK with training areas 
and a safe haven in Syria and Lebanon. After approximately four years of gathering and 
training recruits, Ocalan felt it was time to return to Southeast Turkey. 
When the PKK moved back into Southeast Turkey Ocalan established an absolutist 
philosophy that the PKK was the only true representative of the Kurds. This philosophy 
called on the PKK to first exterminate all Kurdish opposition in a most brutal fashion. The 
opposition to be squelched included the traditional Kurdish leadership (who the PKK 
considered collaborators) and any other leftist or Kurdish parties. The excessive violence 
of the PKK, which often killed entire families, was only to be outdone by the soon-to-arrive 
Turkish Security Forces (Galletti, 1999, pi). Only after Ocalan had ridden himself of his 
Kurdish rivals was he prepared to take on the Turkish establishment.   However, by killing 
so many Kurds, Ocalan and the PKK incurred the hatred of numerous Kurdish families and 
clans. This blood feuding is extremely hard to overcome and is a major reason why most 
of the people killed in Turkey have been Kurds targeted by other Kurds, not by Turks. 
Another Ocalan factor is his maximalist aims. He sought nothing less than the 
creation of an independent Kurdistan carved out of parts of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. 
This posed serious threats to the Kurdish factions in Northern Iraq for a series of reasons. 
First, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) 
have fought hard to get the territory they have; why take a chance on giving it up on the 
long shot of a united Kurdistan? Second, the US, Turkey and several other countries 
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recognize and support the KDP and PUK. These other countries oppose an independent 
Kurdistan. So, the KDP and PUK would have risked external support and any legitimacy 
they have if they bought into Ocalan's PKK agenda. Thus, just on their own, Ocalan's 
goals went a long way to dividing Kurdish factions. 
The Turkish military could not have asked for a better situation. The military had 
warned Turks for years that Kurds were separatists and terrorists. Enter Ocalan and the 
PKK with its brutal tactics, fulfilling the expectations of Turks, and giving the military free 
rein to take control of the Southeast and clean house. 
E.        MASS HOSTILITY 
Mass hate is an interesting prospect in the case of the Turks and Kurds. Of all the 
cases this is the one where mass hate has taken off, but has not spread like wild fire. There 
is plenty of hate to go around, but much of it is focused among Kurdish factions in the 
Southeast. 
Turkish civil society has never regared the Kurdish issue as something to take 
seriously. It is not something that has been given much dialogue or visibility. Over the 
years it has been the government's policy that Kurds were just Mountain Turks who spoke 
a corrupted form of Turkish. There has been some polarization, but Kurds who live in 
Western Turkey have not threatened Turkish citizens, nor have there been large-scale 
attacks instigated by Turks against Kurdish enclaves. Over the last ten year hatred of 
Kurds has risen because conflict has intensified. But much of the hate seems to be focused 
on Ocalan and the PKK versus the Kurdish people. 
As far as the Kurds go, there is mass hate. But much of it is directed against the 
Turkish government and Security Forces, not against the Turkish people per se. Although 
there is animosity and the situation could still change there is not the visceral hatred that 
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exists between Serbs and Albanians. Most Kurds give credit to the PKK for gaining 
concessions, but in surveys in the Southeast less than half the Kurdish population supports 
the PKK's methods and objectives (Gunter pg 129). By using such excessive brutality 
against so many Kurds and Kurdish families, the PKK divided, rather than united the Kurds 
in Southeast Turkey. As in most tribal societies, revenge is a strong motivator. When the 
PKK killed members of rival Kurdish organizations and traditional Kurdish village leaders, 
it sank its own ship. Instead of liquidating the opposition the PKK created more opponents. 
The PKK has also basically followed the policy of "having no quarrel with the 
Turkish people" The PKK claims its war lies with Turkish government. This has, for the 
most part, led the PKK to not attack Turkish civilians in the west. This decision has led to 
limited polarization of Turkish and Kurdish societies. This is a very different approach 
than that chosen by many ethnic nationalist organizations; many would have taken the war 
to the Turkish civilians, hoping for reprisals against Kurdish civilians and an escalation of 
the conflict. 
Another reason for the limited take-off of mass hate is that most Turkish Kurds do 
not want an independent Kurdistan. The majority would be happy with a federation that 
recognizes their ethnic identity. This difference in objectives between the majority of 
Turkish Kurds and the PKK demonstrates that the PKK has not been able to radicalize the 
Turkish Kurds on a large scale. It also shows that a majority of Kurds do not hate Turkish 
society enough to want a total split. This popular outlook is critical when comparing the 
Kurds to Albanians, Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Croats who, during referendums on 
independence, consistently voted above 90 percent for independence from Serbia. 
The Turkish Security Forces have also done an excellent job of encouraging hatred 
and division among different factions of Kurds in the Southeast. The Turks are experts at 
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the divide and rule strategy. They implemented the village guard system by which they 
paid groups of Kurds, usually through the village leader, to fight and defend their village 
from the PKK. This was an easy way, in a clannish society, to instill hatred among the 
Kurds. 
The Turks had also have an advantage in the human intelligence arena, unlike Serbs 
and Albanians. Visually, Turks and Kurds can pass for one another, the language barrier is 
minimal because many Kurds do not always speak Kurdish and, for the most part, Islam is 
the shared religion. This gives the Turks an upper hand in penetrating and destabilizing 
Kurdish organizations. 
I feel the reason that hate has not blossomed is that most Kurds do feel it is the 
Turkish government - not the Turkish people - that is oppressing them. The two cultures 
are similar enough that, with a common religion and a majority of Kurds speaking Turkish, 
Kurds can identify with Turks. And even though the Turkish Security Forces have killed 
and displaced many civilians they have not engaged in wholesale slaughter, which is 
something that invariably unites an ethnicity and turns a limited war into a total life and 
death struggle. There is also the fact that many Kurds are well integrated and accepted in 
Turkish society.   This leaves a lot of Kurds hoping that their ethnic problems can be settled 
in the political arena. 
In the long run, Kurdish mass hate is focused on the Turkish Government and other 
Kurds. Turks for the most part do not detest Kurds, although they detest the PKK. This 
could all change if the PKK or other nationalist movements begin attacking targets in the 
west, especially civilian targets. 
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V.        CONCLUSION 
After completing the case studies it is my conclusion that the framework presented 
in this thesis can work as both a predictor and a key to gaming a better understanding of 
ethnic conflict. All of the cases studied easily fit into the framework, but each was slightly 
different in its own way. In the conclusion I will draw out some of the major themes, as 
well as some of the differences and the similarities among cases. This comparison and 
contrast will also demonstrate that the framework has wide applicability. I will finish this 
chapter with recommendations. 
A.        COMPARISION AND CONTRAST 
Under the precondition of there being a history of pre-existing ethnic tension, all 
factions in every case had legitimate grievances against one another. In the cases of 
Kosovo and Bosnia, the historical tension goes back centuries as opposed to Southeast 
Turkey, where the tension began only in the 1920s. In all three cases there are living 
witnesses and survivors who felt personally aggrieved. The fact that these people are the 
living repository of ethnic memory increases the likelihood that ethic conflict will reoccur. 
These cases also suggest that a long history of ethnic tension combined with recent 
violence is more powerful than just a recent history of tension. A long history often gives 
people and politicians much more material to work with when trying to incite hostility. 
Hence, in Bosnia and Kosovo the historical dimensions are more powerful than they are in 
Southeastern Turkey. 
Stereotypes and generally held views also contribute to the fear of domination. An 
interesting similarity between the Bosnian Muslims, Albanians in Kosovo, and the Kurds in 
Southeastern Turkey is that they are regarded by Serbs and Turks as primitive, ignorant 
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and, to some extent, as lawless. Both Albanians in Kosovo and the Kurds in Southeastern 
Turkey are traditionally herding peoples and thus tend to be very clannish. 
On the one hand, then, local interactions and historical interrelations must certainly 
be considered important. On the other hand, at the national level, economics may be more 
powerful still. Most people generally will not fight if they are economically prosperous 
and have something economically invested in the system.   Without question, general 
economic insecurity greatly contributed to Bosnia's collapse. Bosnia had always been the 
least prosperous and most economically troubled of Yugoslavia's Republics. It also 
suffered greatly in the midst of a failed Yugoslav economic system. Similarly, in Kosovo 
and Southeastern Turkey the majority of the inhabitants are dependent on agricultural and 
pastoral occupations. These areas were economic basket cases and a perceived financial 
drain on the remainder of their respective countries. Thus, the inhabitants of Kosovo and 
the Kurds in Southeastern Turkey found that economically-speaking they had little to lose 
by fighting. 
As for political inequality, the three cases represent two different pictures. In 
Bosnia and Kosovo the trend has been to emphasize distinctly different ethnic groups. 
These groups have long been granted specific rights and protections; some ethnic groups 
even have republics in which they are the majority. Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and 
Kosovo Albanians were never encouraged to think of themselves as Yugoslav first and 
members of their ethnic group second. Combine this almost complete loyalty to different 
ethnicities with a weak federal system and the result was political conflict between 
ethnicities and Republics. Turkey, in contrast, heralded the concept of "one Turkey, one 
people". As far as the Turkish state and Turkish nationalism were concerned everybody 
was Turkish, whether they liked it or not. There was no room for any other ethnicity; even 
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the discussion of the topic was taboo. Yet, Kurds clearly knew they belonged to a different 
ethnicity and were not being represented by the government. This feeling and their 
commitment to remaining Kurdish eventually contributed to open warfare. The lesson to 
be drawn from both of these cases is that either of these extremes - too much emphasis on 
ethnicity or too little - can lead to ethnic conflict. Somewhere in the middle there must be 
a balance, but a balance no one pays much attention to. 
There are also instances of political entrepreneurship in each of these cases. The 
characteristics that define these entrepreneurs remain the same: men who have maximalist 
aims, who take a "no compromise" approach, and display willingness to have others use 
violence in pursuit of their objectives. Again, as with too much or too little emphasis 
placed on ethnicity, there seem to be two types of entrepreneurs: rabid nationalists or those 
riding the nationalist train to get to the top. On the rabid nationalist end of the spectrum are 
such leaders as Croatia's Franjo Tudjman and the Bosnian Serb, Radovon Karadzic. These 
entrepreneurs basically hated anyone who was not a member of their ethnic group and were 
out to get everything they could on behalf of their fellow-Croatians or fellow-Serbs. 
Entrepreneurs of this type are generally very committed to their cause and therefore hard to 
deal with. On the other end of the continuum was an individual like Slobodan Milosevic. 
Milosevic is generally considered to have acted with his personal interests in mind, using 
Serb nationalism as a vehicle to secure his position at the top. Less clear is what motivated 
the Kurdish leader, Abdul Ocalan. Perhaps he falls somewhere in the middle. He definitely 
had maximalist aims and displayed a 'no compromise' approach. But it was his willingness 
to use copious amounts of violence on his own people which is what really set him apart. 
He was not even willing to compromise with Kurds who shared his objectives, but 
disavowed his methods. Ironically, even the Turkish military establishment has to be 
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considered entrepreneur-like in its approach. This organization has not let the political 
wing of the Turkish government settle the Kurdish problem. The military has instead 
always approached the situation with a "no compromise" attitude. Its end state is a military 
solution, which will never solve the real problem, which is to satisfy the Kurds' desire for 
ethnic recognition at the very least. 
Finally, mass hostility has proved rampant in all three cases. Kosovo is the place 
where very little outside instigation was needed. The differences between Kosovo 
Albanians and Serbs are so great that mass hatred, burning at different levels, already 
existed, for quite some time. Much of the fear and mistrust was grounded in reality and 
reciprocal negative perceptions. Stoking mass hate in Bosnia needed a bit more assistance, 
which was provided by political entrepreneurs spreading a message of hate and mistrust, 
refugees from other conflicts settled in Bosnia, and an increase in violence perpetuated by 
criminal and para-military groups. Interestingly, the Turkish/Kurdish mass hostility is not 
quite at these levels yet. It has not taken complete hold for a number of reasons. The 
Turkish and Kurdish cultures are similar (thanks to a shared religion and history), 
clannishness focused Kurds' animosities on other Kurds as much as on Turks, the Turkish 
government is willing to accept assimilation as an alternative to expulsion or extermination, 
and Kurdish nationalists have generally chosen to not target Turkish civilians, thereby 
limiting the visceral hatred that spawns large scale ethnic violence. 
B.        HOW THE FRAMEWORK CAN HELP 
I don't think there is any doubt that, armed with the insight from this framework, a 
Special Forces soldier on the ground will be more effective. The name of the game is the 
ability to gain quick understanding of a complex situation. Ethnic conflict is complex. 
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This framework will assist an operator on the ground in determining what is important in 
the deconstruction or the prediction of ethnic problems or crises. 
The ability to spot key indicators such as symbols is priceless. Many soldiers could 
go into an area and not notice subtle indicators of difference such as longer hair, the 
wearing of berets, or changes in spoken or written language. These subtleties are crucial in 
seeing clearly through the haze of ethnic conflict. 
This framework also points to the importance of noticing financial disparity or 
insecurity caused by an unraveling economic situation. If one ethnicity in the area is 
economically disproportionately ahead of the others, or is perceived to be, this is key 
information and a fault line that bears watching. General economic insecurity is just as 
important to note. This insecurity and resource competition can divide groups along ethnic 
lines. 
Political inequality is also something this framework emphasizes. It is critical to 
understand how a population sees itself fitting into the political apparatus. If a group feels 
that the government is not representing its best interests fighting could soon follow. 
Along with political inequality comes the rise of political entrepreneurs. The 
operator could learn not only what leaders are like, but also what the people that follow 
them think - i.e. are they behind the leader because he promises a better economic policy 
or are they behind the leader because he is against the opposing ethnicity. These are key 
points this framework encourages soldiers to consider. 
The factor of opposing the other ethnicity feeds into noticing mass hostility. Mass 
hostility is a great example of a factor that is best picked up by operators on the ground. 
Indicators can come in the form of speech, general actions, and hostile actions. A person 
on the ground can best determine if certain hostile actions are the work of a select few 
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troublemakers or whether thy instead signal that the general population is turning to 
violence. The difference is critical. 
If nothing else, the framework gives the operator on the ground something to focus 
on besides reacting to everyday events. A framework offers depth and provides a more 
strategic way of approaching a situation. 
Examining these cases, while in a school setting was very enlightening. I have had 
the luxury of time to prove that the framework is valid. I think that knowledge of this 
framework would help any Special Forces soldier better understand the ethnic conflict 
dynamic, thereby enabling him to function more effectively and efficiently, particularly 
when the one thing he lacks - time to study the situation objectively - is what he most 
needs. The framework offers an objective way to sort through the situation on the ground. 
It is not culture or country-specific, yet in its application forces operators to consider local 
conditions and aspects of life not only those on the ground are likely to reflect. 
This framework could be introduced in the Qualification course, just as are the 
theories of guerilla warfare. Or it could be a part of pre-mission training depending on the 
mission.   Either way, operators need some exposure to an ethnic conflict framework. 
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